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Making It Up: Lessons for
Equal Protection Doctrine from the Use and
Abuse of Hypothesized Purposes in the
Marriage Equality Litigation
STEVE SANDERS*
To survive rational basis scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, a law must
serve a governmental purpose which is at least legitimate. It is well established that
legitimate purposes can sometimes be found through speculation and
conjecture-that is, they may be hypothesized-in order to avoid the difficulties of
identifying actual purpose or the specter of courts second-guessing legislative
judgments. But hypothesized purposes can be abused, and such abuse was rampant
in the states' defenses of their bans on same-sex marriage, bans which were
ultimately invalidated in Obergefell v. Hodges.
This Article draws on the federal marriage litigation as a lens for thinking critically
about hypothesized purposes. It suggests several lessons about hypothesized
purposes that should guide courts in the future. In particular, I discuss (I) the
differences between hypothesized purposes, which are grounded in facts and
concerns that were conceivably before a legislature, and post-hoc rationalizations,
which I define as pretexts that have been manufactured to satisfy rational basis
scrutiny but which could not plausibly have been a legislative purpose; (2) how
courts should approach hypothesized purposes when there is evidence that a law was
impelled by animus; and (3) why hypothesized purposes are inappropriate and
should receive skeptical scrutiny when they are offered in support of measures
enacted through direct democracy.
* Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law, Bloomington. For helpful
conversations and suggestions as this project evolved, I am gratcful to the participants in the 2015 Loyola
University Constitutional Law Colloquium, participants in a 2016 faculty workshop at the University of New
Mexico School of Law, and to individual colleagues and scholars including Eric Berger, Evan Bernick,
Daniel Conkle, Katie Eyer, Dawn Johnsen, David Williams, and Susan Williams. I am also grateful to
Samantha Von Endc for her research assistance.
T. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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INTRODUCTION
Hypothesized purposes are a familiar feature of Equal Protection
Clause doctrine, but their use has never been without criticism,2 and
2. For criticisms of the permissibility of hypothesized purposes, see, for example, CLARK M. NETLY 111,
TERMS or ENGAGLMLNr: How OUR COURIs SHOULD ENFORCE THE CONSTIrUTION's PROMISE Ot LIMsID
GOVERNMENT 49-63 (2013); U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 187 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
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federal courts continue to wrestle with defining the boundaries of their
appropriate use. In the ordinary case under rational basis review, a court
is supposed to determine whether a classification is "rationally related to
a legitimate governmental purpose."' But the Supreme Court has often
said that, rather than attempting to determine the actual purpose for
which a law was enacted, a court applying rational basis review may rely
on speculation and conjecture about the legislature's aims. This approach
to judicial review under rational basis stems from the principle of judicial
deference to legislative decisionmaking and supports the "presumption
of constitutionality" that applies to most laws.4
The principle that hypothesized purposes are typically acceptable
under rational basis review explains why Williamson v. Lee Optical of
Oklahoma, Inc., an otherwise mundane case about the manner in which a
state regulated opticians,' remains a fixture in constitutional law casebooks.
In Williamson, a Supreme Court still haunted by criticism of the aggressive
judicial interventionism of the Lochner era6 conjured up speculative
legitimate purposes for a legislative classification with no pretense of
examining an actual legislative record. "It is enough that there is an evil at
hand for correction," the Court explained, "and that it might be thought
that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it."'
To this day, the Court continues to state as doctrine that, other than in
cases involving a fundamental right or a suspect or quasi-suspect class, a
law will be upheld if "there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts
that could provide a rational basis for the classification.""
Hypothesized purposes are not inherently illegitimate. Accepting
hypothesized purposes prevents courts from engaging in unnecessary
examination or second guessing of the legislative process. And oftentimes,
a hypothesized purpose may simply represent a court's best effort to
infer the actual purpose of a law from a spotty or nonexistent legislative
record. On the other hand, for advocates of what has come to be called
"judicial engagement," the easy acceptance of sometimes far-fetched or
implausible hypothesized purposes, going hand-in-hand with the
minimalist version of rational basis review that most lower courts believe
([T]hc actual purposes of Congress, rather than the post hoc justifications offered by Government attorneys,
must be the primary basis for analysis under the rational-basis test.").
3. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432. 446 (1985) (emphasis added).
4. See infra Part I.A.
5. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
6. See id. at 488 ("The day is gone when this Court uses ... the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down
state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out
of harmony with a particular school of thought.").
7. Id. (emphasis added).
8. Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 132 S. Ct. 2073, 2080 (2012) (quoting F.C.C. v. Beach Commc'ns.
Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)).
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they are supposed to apply, too often represents an abdication of courts'
responsibility to enforce the Constitution.'
Even if it is settled that hypothesized purposes have a proper role to
play in rational basis review it is necessary to recognize that they can be
abused. Experience demonstrates that the use of hypothesized purposes can
go far beyond deference to ordinary lawmaking and become (to paraphrase
the late constitutional theorist Charles Black) a ritually sanctioned way to
prevent a court, as a court, from permissibly learning what is obvious to
everyone else, including the judge.' This phenomenon becomes an
especially serious problem where there is good reason to believe that the
actual reasons for a law are based on animus or other constitutionally
improper purposes.
This Article explores the use and abuse of hypothesized purposes,
utilizing the recently concluded federal marriage equality litigation as its
lens. The proper role of hypothesized purposes in equal protection analysis
is a subject that has escaped adequate recent attention by commentators"
or serious examination by the Court. This Article seeks to demonstrate
why, in the wake of the marriage litigation, the question deserves a place
at the center of our thinking about constitutional equal protection.
The marriage litigation, which culminated when the Supreme Court
struck down the remaining state bans on same-sex marriage in Obergefell
v. Hodges," provides a rich source of material for considering the role of
hypothesized purposes. In the years leading up to Obergefell, countless
pages of briefing and lower court opinions were devoted to advancing,
refuting, and evaluating the states' hypothesized purposes for their
marriage bans (which this Article also refers to interchangeably as "mini-
DOMAs"), most notably the hypothesis that bans on same-sex marriage
were rationally related to the government's interest in promoting
"responsible procreation" among heterosexuals." Indeed, from their
9. See, e.g., NELLY 111, supra note 2, at 50.
To. See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness ofthe Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 42T, 427 (1960).
TT. For previous scholarly discussion of hypothesized purposes, see, for example, Pamela S. Karlan,
Old Reasons, New Reasons, No Reasons, 27 GA. St. U. L. REV. 873 (2011) (describing and critiquing the
use of hypothesized purposes in several cases dealing with family, gender roles, and sexuality); Robert C.
Farrell, Legislative Purpose and Equal Protection's Rationality Review, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1 22-25 (1992)
(describing the general doctrine of hypothesized purposes); Hans A. Linde, Due Process ofLawnaking,
55 NEB. L. REv. 197, 222, 233-35 (1976) (arguing that post hoc government justification should be
permitted given the nature of the lawmaking process); Gerald Gunther, Foreword, In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 20-21, 44-48
(1972) (proposing a model for equal protection review that would foreclose judicial hypothesizing of
justifications for classifications).
12. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
13. See infra Part II. In brief, "responsible procreation" is the idea that because only opposite-sex
sexual relationships have the inherent possibility to produce children, marriage exists primarily to provide
a legal structure for such procreation and for the regulation of resulting family relationships. See infra
notes 84-87.
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briefs to the Supreme Court and the overall history of the federal
marriage litigation, one could reasonably conclude that the theory of
responsible procreation was the primary legal scaffolding on which the
state marriage bans rested. The central role that hypothesized purposes
played in the marriage litigation-the sheer scale of their use and,
arguably, abuse-presents an opportunity to think critically about this
undertheorized area of equal protection doctrine.
The majority in Obergefell devoted only a few sentences to responsible
procreation. The theory flopped in an anticlimactic fashion, summarily
dismissed by the Court as "counterintuitive""4 and "wholly illogical."" 5
But this cursory treatment hardly seemed to do justice to an argument
that had played such an outsized role throughout the marriage litigation.
One commentator called it "truly shocking" that both the majority and
dissenting opinions "barely even allude to the states' asserted interests
and whether they are sufficient to satisfy rational-basis review!",1
One reason the Court did not give more attention to hypothesized
purposes such as responsible procreation may have been because it
decided Obergefell primarily as a question of the fundamental right to
marry under the substantive component of the Due Process Clause,"
rather than engaging in a traditional equal protection analysis. The Court
did not evaluate whether the marriage bans were rationally related to
some legitimate government purpose. In taking the fundamental rights
approach, the Court avoided the difficult work of attempting to
understand why states had banned same-sex marriage and whether those
bans served purposes that were constitutionally proper or improper.
The implications of the Obergefell Court's approach go well beyond
the now-settled question of marriage equality. Purpose analysis generally
under equal protection has long occupied a contested space. What is
more, rational basis review is the most common form of equal protection
review applied by lower courts day in and day out, and under rational
basis review, hypothesized purposes allow government defendants to
avoid having courts examine the real reasons for why laws were enacted
or actions were taken." The acceptability of hypothesized purposes plays
a major role in explaining why rational basis review is fatal for most
equal protection claims.
14. Obergefell, T35 S. Ct. at 2607.
15. Id. (quoting Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1223 (ioth Cir. 2014)).
16. Marty Lederman, The Remarkable Disappearance of State Justifications in Obergefcll,
BALKINIZATION (July 3, 2015), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2015/o7/the-remarkable-disappearance-of-
statc.html.
17. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598-99.
18. See infra Part I.B.
19. See NETLY III, supra note 2, at 49.
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The misuse of hypothesized purposes in the marriage litigation
deserves serious attention and provides an opportunity to consider some
lessons for the future. For example, the states confused hypothesized
purposes, which are supposed to be grounded in the "knowledge and
experience of . . . legislators, with post hoc rationalizations that are made
up out of whole cloth by government lawyers.i They suggested that
hypothesized purposes could rescue laws that were infected by animus; in
fact, as I will explain, that idea conflicts with the principles and
methodology of the Court's animus cases. States also suggested that
hypothesized purposes were appropriate for constitutional amendments
enacted under direct democracy-a proposition which, as I will also
explain, is both normatively objectionable and doctrinally unsupported .
At the outset, let me be clear about what arguments this Article does
not make. The goal is not to argue against all use of hypothesized purposes. I
accept them as a settled feature of equal protection law that the Supreme
Court is unlikely to abandon. There will often be a blurry line between
hypothesizing a purpose in the absence of facts and inferring a purpose
from an incomplete factual record, and so bright-line rules are not
practical. Instead, the goal of this Article is to explain why, even accepting
the Court's generally deferential approach to rational basis review,
hypothesized purposes in certain forms or contexts are undesirable as a
matter of policy and unsupported as a matter of doctrine.
This Article proceeds in six parts. Part I discusses the arguments for
and against hypothesized purposes and provides a brief overview of
purpose analysis under equal protection. Part II describes the states' use
of hypothesized purposes in the marriage litigation, particularly the
theory of responsible procreation. Part III suggests that, considering
their actual history, context, and effects, the state mini-DOMAs could
have been struck down for improper purpose-that is, as the products of
a lawmaking process impelled by animus against gays and lesbians and
their relationships (based on their history and context) and as official
government expressions of animus (based on their effects). This candid
appraisal of the laws' actual purposes puts us in a better position to
understand why states chose to defend them by using hypothesized
purposes and to assess whether the use of such justifications was
appropriate.
Part VI argues that a proper equal protection analysis requires a
court to focus not just on the discrimination the plaintiff is alleging, but
also on the classification that the government has imposed to cause the
discrimination. There is a difference between inherited understandings
20. Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 132 S. Ct. 2073, 2080 (2012).
2T. See infra Part IV.B.
22. See infra Part V.
23. See infra Part VI.
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that have the incidental effect of creating disadvantage for a group (such
as the longstanding tradition of heterosexual marriage), and recent
enactments that intentionally classify against the interests of that group
(such as the express bans against same-sex marriage), but this distinction
was lost in Obergefell. Failure to focus on the intentional classification
makes it easier for the government to invent entire new purposes for
laws by resorting to post hoc rationalizations, which are nothing more
than pretexts that have been reverse-engineered to satisfy rational basis
review. Part V discusses how courts should handle hypothesized purposes
when there is evidence that the actual purpose of a classification is
improper, and argues that hypothesized purposes cannot be used to rescue
a law that has been infected by animus. Part VI argues that while
hypothesized purposes may be acceptable in the context of ordinary
legislative lawmaking, they should be skeptically examined whenever a
court is evaluating a referendum or ballot initiative, especially something
more fundamental and unusual like a state constitutional amendment.
I. HYPOTHESIZED PURPOSES AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST HYPOTHESIZED PURPOSES
Equal protection addresses classifications of persons by the
government. The appropriate role of hypothesized purposes is one facet
of a larger and ongoing dialogue about what equal protection's rational
basis review is or should be.24 Under rational basis review, a classification
"must be rationally related to a legitimate government purpose."' In other
words, the analysis considers two things: (i) the purpose of a law (that is,
its "legitimacy"), and (2) the ends/means connection (the rationality of the
relationship) between the purpose and the classification. This Article
focuses primarily on the purpose prong of equal protection analysis.
In ordinary lawmaking situations that do not involve a fundamental
right, a suspect classification (such as race), or quasi-suspect classification
(such as gender), actual legislative purpose rarely has any constitutional
24. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rational Basis Test Is Constitutional (and Desirable), 14 GEO.
JL. & Pim. PoT.y 401 (2016); Katic R. Eycr, Constitutional Crossroads and the Canon of Rational Basis
Review, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 527, 534 (2014) (arguing that the meaning of rational basis under equal
protection doctrine stands at a "transitional moment"); Robert C. Farrell, The Two Versions of Rational-
Basis Review and Same-Sex Relationships, 86 WASH. L. REV. 281, 282 (20TT) (criticizing rational basis
review as unpredictable because the Supreme Court has used both deferential and more aggressive forms,
"but does not acknowledge that a conflict exists between them"); Gunther, supra note TT, at 20--24 (arguing
for a more aggressive form of rational basis review that "would have the Court take seriously a constitutional
requirement that has ncver been formally abandoned: that legislative means must substantially further
legislative ends," and that "[p]utting consistent new bite into the old equal protection would mean that the
Court would be less willing to supply justifying rationales by exercising its imagination.").
25. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985).
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significance. Most laws, if challenged, are subject only to rational basis
review, and the Supreme Court has called rational basis review "a paradigm
of judicial restraint." 7 As a general rule, the Court has instructed lower
courts to give a broad presumption of constitutionality to ordinary
lawmaking, and to apply a generous understanding of what makes a
classification "rational.," "The Constitution presumes that, absent some
reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will eventually be
rectified by the democratic process," the Court has said, "and that judicial
intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may
think a political branch has acted.""
The arguments in favor of hypothesized purposes are grounded in
judicial deference. The Court has reasoned that the acceptability of
hypothesized purposes under rational basis serves the constitutional
separation of powers by preventing courts from engaging in unnecessary
inquiries into the legislative process and thus second guessing the
judgments of a co-equal branch of government.' While heightened
scrutiny for suspect or quasi-suspect classifications "limits the realm of
justification to demonstrable reality," rational basis "permits a court to
hypothesize interests that might support legislative distinctions.". "It is
enough that there is an evil at hand for correction," the Court explained
in Williamson, "and that it might be thought that the particular legislative
measure was a rational way to correct it." "... 'Because we never require a
legislature to articulate its reasons for enacting a statute," the Court
elaborated in EC.C. v. Beach Communications," "it is entirely irrelevant
for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason"-that is, the
hypothesized purpose-"for the challenged distinction actually motivated
the legislature."3
26. F.C.C. v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) ("[E]qual protection is not a license for
courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices. In areas of social and economic policy,
a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional
rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of
facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification."); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979)
("The Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will
cventually be rectified by the democratic process and that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted
no matter how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted."); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro.
Hous. Dcv. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) ("[I]t is because legislators and administrators are properly
concerned with balancing numerous competing considerations that courts refrain from reviewing the
merits of their decisions, absent a showing of arbitrariness or irrationality.").
27. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. at 314.
28. See supra note 26 and cases discussed therein.
29. Vance, 440 U.S. at 97.
30. See supra note 26 and cases discussed therein.
31. Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 77 (2001) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
32. Williamson v. Lec Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (cmphasis added).
33. F.C.C. v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993).
34. Id.
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The arguments against hypothesized purposes arise from the principle
that judicial review for constitutionality should be meaningful, even where
a law does not affect a fundamental right, a suspect class, or a quasi-
suspect class. Resorting to hypothesized purposes, and thus avoiding the
search for a law's actual purpose, risks devaluing constitutional protections
for forms of discrimination that receive only rational basis review. All
actions of the political branches are subject to constitutional limitations,
and the "presumption of constitutionality" and its accompanying relaxed
form of judicial review do not mean that constitutional limitations do not
exist outside of fundamental rights or suspect/quasi-suspect classes. They
simply mean that the Court chooses to assume that legislative bodies
acting through regular legislative processes usually can be trusted not to
violate these limitations.
But judicial trust should not mean judicial abdication. As Justice
John Paul Stevens observed, where a court can rationalize a justification
for a law under virtually any "conceivable set of facts," the review is too
often "tantamount to no review at all." 5 Professor Erwin Chemerinsky has
argued that it is possible to support the deference of rational basis review
while standing by the principle that any "discrimination or denial of liberty
or property should be justified by some legitimate purpose," not a made-
up one.' Another commentator observes that "[t]he Constitution constrains
not merely how the government acts, but also, and more sig[n]ificantly,
what the government may seek to do."3 7 In recent years, libertarian
proponents of "judicial engagement," who favor a more meaningful form
of rational basis review, have been especially bitter critics of hypothesized
purposes, arguing that they devalue the role of facts in litigation and allow
open dishonesty by government attorneys. "While such conduct might
well be sanctionable in other court proceedings," one such advocate has
written, "in rational basis cases it is simply business as usual.""'
B. CAN COURTS IDENTIFY A LAW'S ACTUAL "PURPOSE"?
Another argument for accepting hypothesized purposes is that it
may be difficult for a Court to identify the actual purpose a law was
intended to serve. But where constitutional rights are at stake, even
under rational basis review, the simple fact that purpose analysis can be
difficult should not be a reason to forego it altogether.
35. Id. at 323 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring); see U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 187 (ig8o)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he actual purposes of Congress, rather than the post hoc justifications offered
by Government attorneys, must be the primary basis for analysis under the rational-basis test.").
36. Chemerinsky, supra note 24, at 413.
37. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CAuIF. L. REV. 297,309 (1997).
38. Clark Neily, No Such Thing: Litigating Under the Rational Basis Test, i N.Y.U. J.L. & LunRry
897, 906 (2005).
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At the outset, it is useful to distinguish between the purpose of a law
and the motives of legislators or voters who enact a law. As the term will
be used throughout this Article, "purpose" refers to the governmental
"object to be attained";" it answers the question: "At what end was the
law directed?" 4 ' Given that a law must, at minimum, serve a "legitimate
governmental purpose,"4" it is a premise of equal protection law that the
purpose of a law may be objectively determined in judicial review. After
all, all laws are proposed and enacted to address specific problems, or
with the expectation that, by legislating in favor of some public value or
against some public evil, lawmakers will create conditions that allow
members of a polity to realize their collective social goals.
By contrast, the term motive refers to the reasons why an individual
legislator or citizen voted for a law. Motives are personal and subjective.4 2
The term is properly restricted to those considerations that cause an
individual legislator or voter to support or oppose a law. Because they are
personal, seeking to use motives in the analysis of whether an enactment
violates the Constitution is problematic and disfavored. Difficult as it may
be, it is part of the judicial role to seek to untangle personal motives from
a law's instantiation of an official government purpose. For example, one
commentator on Brown v. Board of Education has observed that while a
legislator may have voted in favor of school segregation for motives
ranging from beliefs about racial inferiority to fears of miscegenation to
concern for preserving white jobs, the segregation laws had a judicially
cognizable purpose as a matter of government policy: at the most basic
level, "to assure racial separation," and at a "more sophisticated level,... to
isolate Negroes in order to preserve for whites superior status while
simultaneously maintaining for Negroes a position of inferior status.. .. "4
Purpose and motive are frequently confused, and courts and
commentators are often not scrupulous about distinguishing between
them.44 The Supreme Court has sometimes observed that purpose
analysis can be difficult;45 the search for purpose can be "elusive."46 Some
commentators express doubt about judges' ability to determine a law's
39. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
40. Farrell, supra note i i, at 8.
41. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985).
42. Farrell, supra note i i, at 5 ("The term 'motive' is saved for the subjective motivations of individual
legislators.").
43. Ira Michael Heyman, The ChiefJustice, Racial Segregation, and the Friendly Critics, 49 CATIF.
L. REV. 104, 115-16 (1961).
44. Farrell, supra note Ti, at 8-9 ("[W]orthwhile distinctions [between legislative purpose and
legislative motive I are lost mainly due to the courts' use of the terms interchangeably.").
45. E.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dcv. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) ("Rarely can it
be said that a legislature or administrative body operating under a broad mandate made a decision motivated
solely by a single concern, or even that a particular purpose was the 'dominant' or 'primary' one.").
46. McGinnis v. Royster, 41o U.S. 263, 276 (1973).
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actual purpose,47 while others have found a distinction between motive
and purpose unworkable.#" Determining a law's purpose may be
especially difficult where little or no legislative history exists, or where a
measure is a last-minute addition to an unrelated enactment.
Notwithstanding these problems, though, the Court has never said
purpose analysis is impossible. Indeed, if it were impossible, there could,
by definition, be no equal protection analysis, because there would be no
government interest or public value against which to measure the
classification so that a court could evaluate the rationality of the relationship
between the two. A court's ability to understand a law's purpose-or at
least its ability to ferret out improper purpose-is necessary if equal
protection review is to have any meaning.49 Unlike individual motives,
the purpose of a law is a matter of public concern, and thus a proper
subject for judicial review. Even Justice Antonin Scalia, who was noted
for his criticisms of the indeterminacy of the use of things like legislative
floor speeches in attempting to understand why a legislature had passed a
law," acknowledged the distinction between motive and purpose: Although
"discerning the subjective motivation of those enacting [a] statute is ...
almost always an impossible task[,]" he observed, "it is possible to
discern the objective 'purpose' of a statute (i.e., the public good at which
its provisions appear to be directed)[.] " And as Erwin Chemerinsky has
noted, courts are expected to focus on actual purpose when they apply
intermediate or strict scrutiny."
47. E.g., David A. Strauss, Response Essay, The Name Game. CATO UNBOuND (Sept. 14, 2016)
https://www.cato-unbound.org/20T6/09/14/david-strauss/name-game ("[J]udgcs might.... misapprehend 'the
government's true ends. They might be mistaken about what rights the Constitution actually protects[,]"' or
"[tjhey might be wrong about what the constitutionally proper objectives of government are.").
48. E.g., John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YATE
L.J. 1205. 1217-21 (1970).
49. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) ("[E]ven in the ordinary equal protection case
calling for the most deferential of standards, we insist on knowing the relation between the classification
adopted and the object to be attained. The search for the link between classification and objective gives
substance to the Equal Protection Clausc[.]"); Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 22T, 244 n.6 (1981) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) ("Ascertainment of actual purpose to the extent feasible, however, remains an essential step in
equal protection."); Farrell, supra note it, at 21 ("Although the difficulties with the idea of legislative
purpose are substantial, it is clear that it is relevant to constitutional adjudication.").
50. See, e.g., Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualization of Legislative History in the Supreme Court,
2000 Wis. L. REV. 205, 217-20 (discussing Justice Scalia's criticisms of legislative history).
51. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578. 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
52. Chemerinsky, supra note 24, at 410.
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[T]he difficulty of knowing actual purpose or the fact that the same law
could be both constitutional and unconstitutional depending on the
articulated purpose might be a reason never to inquire into actual purpose;
they are not reasons why rational basis review alone does not merit an
inquiry into the actual purpose of the law.53
In fact, despite its difficulty, for better or worse courts routinely
engage in a large amount of purpose analysis. In a wide-ranging historical
analysis of the history of judicial review of legislative purpose, Caleb
Nelson documents that, especially since the 1970s, analysis of purpose has
become a routine and accepted feature of constitutional law, and "judicial
inquiries into legislators' true goals are now ... widely accepted."5 4 Thus,
"[i]n modern practice, one of the main reasons to hold a statute invalid 'on
its face' is that the statute was enacted for an unconstitutional purpose,
which taints all of its possible applications."5 Purpose analysis is not only
relevant to Fourteenth Amendment law. Writing in 1996, then-Professor
Elena Kagan similarly argued that "First Amendment law, as developed
by the Supreme Court over the past several decades, has as its primary,
though unstated, object the discovery of improper governmental motives.",'
C. IMPROPER PURPOSES
Given the general principle of deference to legislators, under rational
basis review the primary objective of purpose analysis is to detect improper
purpose. In rational basis review, "improper purpose" most often is
synonymous with animus. It refers to a law which "appears to rest on an
irrational prejudice against" the group it affects,57  manifests a
"bare . . . desire to harm" the group, or that it is the product of "a
legislative process impelled by animus" against the group.9 The key cases
that illustrate this form of improper purpose-a group of decisions that Dale
Carpenter has labeled an "animus quadrilogy,"6 o and which will be referred
53. Id.
54. Caleb Nelson, Judicial Review of Legislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1784, 1789 (2008). For
another wide ranging discussion, see Calvin Massey, The Role of Governmental Purpose in Constitutional
Judicial Review, 59 S.C. L. Rv. 1, 2-6 (2007).
55. Nelson, supra note 54, at 1795; see Bhagwat, supra note 37, at 337 ("[TIhe [Supremel Court has
demonstrated both a willingness and an ability to identify and assess the legitimacy of the purposes
underlying a variety of governmental actions.").
56. Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. Cin. L. REV. 413. 414 (1996). Although Kagan uses the term "governmental
motives," this Article interprets that as referring to government purpose, not the personal motives of
individual legislators.
57. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432. 450 (1985).
58 . U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
59. Dale Carpenter, Windsor Products: Equal Protection from Animus, in TIHL SUPRLML COURT
RvIEw, 2013 183, 184 (Dennis J. Hutchinson ct al. eds., 2014); see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996)
(holding that a classification violates equal protection where "the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity
toward the class of persons affected.").
6o. Carpenter, supra note 59, at 187.
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to at various points in this Article-include United States v. Windsor,
Romer v. Evans,6 2 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 6  and U.S.
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno.4
While a legislature, not a court, may be in the best position to
determine how best to regulate various sectors of, for example, the
telecommunications industry, even if the effect of that regulation is to
advantage one sector and disadvantage another," that sort of quotidian
legislative line-drawing is qualitatively and morally different from
government policies that emerge from "a legislative process impelled by
animus" or which are made with "an evil eye and an unequal hand."
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has said that the usual presumption of
constitutionality reflected in rational basis review does not apply where a
classification "proceeds along suspect lines"68 or where there is "some
reason to infer antipathy."6 ' The government purposes behind a law must
at least be "legitimate and nonillusory."7 In Williamson, the Court
indicated that deference to hypothesized purposes reaches its limit where
a law involves "invidious discrimination."7  What makes the Court's
animus cases distinctive in rational basis doctrine are their skepticism
toward hypothesized purposes" and their willingness to engage in more
rigorous assessment of the rationality between a law's ends and means.
While animus accounts for most of the situations where laws fail
rational basis review,74 courts on rare occasions have found others as well.
In a property tax case, the Court held that equal protection was violated
when assessment practices, without any apparent legitimate purpose,
"systematically produced dramatic differences in valuation between
61. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2675-76 (2013) (striking down a federal law defining
marriage as the union of one man and one woman).
62. Romer, 517 U.S. at 620 (striking down a state constitutional amendment barring specific legal
protection from anti-gay discrimination).
63. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 432 (1985) (striking down a city's denial
of a special zoning permit for housing the cognitively disabled).
64. U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 528 (1973) (striking down a federal law denying
food stamps to unrelated persons living in a household).
65. See F.C.C. v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 315 (1993).
66. Carpenter, supra note 59, at 184.
67. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
68. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 5o8 U.S. at 313.
69. Id. at 314.
70. McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 276 (1973).
71. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
72. Carpenter, supra note 59, at 190 ("The sometimes far-fetched and hypothesized rationalizations that
suffice to sustain a law in ordinary rational-basis cases don't suffice once animus is detected.").
73. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (observing that "[wihen
a law exhibits such a desire to harm a politically unpopular group, we have applied a more searching form
of rational basis review .... ").
74. Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDmIAs L. Rev. 887, 889 (2012) ("[When
animus is found, it functions as a doctrinal silver bullet.").
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petitioners' recently transferred property and otherwise comparable
surrounding land."75 In recent years, several federal circuit courts have
held that sheer governmental favoritism or protectionism for one
business or economic group over another is not a constitutionally proper
purpose, though it is not fatal if it advances some independent legitimate
purpose such as public health or safety.
With this brief background on purpose analysis, we are ready to turn
to same-sex marriage, responsible procreation, and what the confrontation
between the two should teach us about hypothesized purposes.
II. HYPOTHESIZING RESPONSIBLE PROCREATION
States defending their same-sex marriage bans in the Supreme Court,
as well as in lower federal court litigation that preceded Obergefell, took
pains not to argue that the bans were justified because gays and lesbians
were immoral or in some way unfit for marriage. They did not argue that
same-sex marriage posed any sort of social evil that their state lawmaking
processes were entitled to address. For example, the State of Michigan
told the Sixth Circuit in one of the cases that would later be consolidated
into Obergefell that "[b]y reaffirming the definition of marriage that has
always existed in Michigan, Michigan's voters did not disparage other
relationships or deny the obvious point that same-sex couples can
provide loving homes."7 7
Of course, the states could hardly have argued otherwise. The Supreme
Court's previous gay-rights decisions-Romer v. Evans,'< Lawrence v.
Texas and United States v. Windsoro-fhave collectively come to stand for
the principle that official government expressions of moral disapproval
toward homosexuality or same-sex relationships are not proper
government purposes.8 Yet state officials undoubtedly must have
recognized that it would be difficult to defend their bans based on the
laws' actual history, context, and effects, which will be described in
75. Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Cty. Comm'n of Webster Cty., 488 U.S. 336, 34' (1989).
76. Eg., St. Joseph Abbey v. Castillc, 7T2 F.3d 215, 222 (5th Cir. 2013) (explaining that "protecting or
favoring a particular intrastate industy"-in this case, the funeral industry is not a legitimate government
purpose if it cannot "be linked to advancement of the public interest or general welfare"); Craigmiles v.
Giles, 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002) (reaching the same conclusion as St. Joseph Abbey). But see Sensational
Smiles, LLC v. Mullen, 793 F.3d 281, 286 (2d Cir. 2015) (disagreeing in dicta with cases like St. Joseph Abbey
and Craigmiles because "the Supreme Court has long permitted state economic favoritism of all sorts, so long
as that favoritism does not violate specific constitutional provisions or federal statutes.").
77. Brief for Mich. Defendants-Appellants at 4, DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014)
(No. 14-1341).
78. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
79. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 558 (2003).
8o. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
8T. See, e.g., Carpenter, supra note 59, at i88 ("These three momentous decisions involving gay rights
cumulatively make it clear that the perceived social harm of homosexuality, along with simple moral
disapproval of it, is no longer a proper basis on which to carve out gay people from legal protection.").
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Part III. The evidence pointed to the sort of official government animus
that could be fatal to the laws even under rational basis review. Thus, if
laws excluding same-sex couples from marriage were to survive judicial
scrutiny, it would be necessary for states to deny that there was any
animus involved, then to argue that the classifications were rationally
related to some legitimate government interest.
The states relied primarily on the hypothesized purpose of responsible
procreation. Under the Supreme Court's rational basis cases, the states
argued, such a hypothesized purpose must be accepted even if there is no
specific evidence for it in the legislative and public discourse at the time
the bans were adopted. "It matters not," Ohio's brief told the Supreme
Court, "if the reasons offered in court are [actually] the reasons why
lawmakers (or voters) approved the law.""'
According to the states, using marriage law to promote "responsible
procreation" meant taming the wayward behavior of some heterosexuals,
not disparaging homosexuals. Michigan's brief to the Court encapsulated
the responsible procreation argument:
[M]arriage as a public institution-separate from other relationships that
have an emotional connection springs from a feature of opposite-sex
relationships that is biologically different than all other relationships
(including opposite-sex platonic friendships and same-sex relationships):
the sexual union of a man and a woman produces something more than
just an emotional relationship between two people-At produces, without
the involvement of third parties or even a conscious decision, the
possibility of creating a new life. Michigan's marriage definition is designed
to stabilize such relationships, to promote procreation within them, and to
be the expected standard for opposite-sex couples engaged in sexual
relations.4
Similarly, Kentucky told the Court that "[e]ncouraging, promoting,
and supporting the formation of relationships that have the natural ability
to procreate furthers the Commonwealth's fundamental interest in
ensuring humanity's continued existence."'5 Tennessee said that "marriage
cannot be divorced from its procreative purpose,"" and that under rational
basis review, "[a]ny charge that the State's traditional definition of
marriage does not do enough, or even that it does too much, to further the
State's interest must be disregarded in the constitutional analysis.""
82. See, e.g., Brief for the Respondents at i i, DeBoer, 135 S. Ct. 1040 (No. 14-571) ("Responding to
the reality that a man and a woman are generally able to create new life neither discriminates nor entails
animus at all.").
83. Brief for Respondent at 52, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14-556) (citing
U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980)).
84. Id. at 32.
85. Brief for Respondent at 29-30, Bourke v. Beshear, 135 S. Ci. 1732 (2015) (No. 14-574).
86. Brief for Respondents at 39, Tanco v. Haslam, 135 S. Ct. 1732 (2015) (No. 14-562).
87. Id. at 40.
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Responsible procreation was a hypothesized purpose, because the
states made no effort to argue that taking action to address irresponsible
heterosexual procreation was in fact on the minds of legislators or voters
who had approved the anti-gay marriage laws. Rather, in Obergefell and
other marriage cases, courts were presented with what one state called a
"theory" of marriage that was centered on procreation,"' together with an
argument that it was not improper discrimination to exclude from
marriage a group that was not capable of natural procreation. Even if
allowing homosexuals to marry did not directly promote responsible
procreation among heterosexuals, the states were never able to
coherently explain why they found it necessary to categorically exclude
gays and lesbians from marriage, while still allowing elderly or sterile
heterosexuals to marry. But according to the states, rational basis review
must be tolerant of such illogic. Michigan's brief argued that lawmaking
on a matter like marriage was entitled to "the benefit of every doubt.""
In the lower court marriage cases, countless pages of briefing and
opinions were devoted to advancing, refuting, and evaluating the
responsible procreation argument, and from this litigation history, one
could reasonably conclude that "responsible procreation" was the primary
legal scaffolding on which the state marriage bans rested.' In defense of
their marriage bans states also offered various arguments about
federalism,," the democratic process," or the merits of moving slowly on a
controversial question of social change." But these arguments mostly
amounted to calls for judicial abstention or attempts to distinguish the
Court's earlier pro-gay marriage decision in Windsor, not government
purposes that could be examined under equal protection methodology.
As the purported purpose behind the marriage bans, one form or
88. Reply Brief for the Appellants at 17-18, Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7 th Cir. 2014) (Nos. 14-
2386, 14-2387. 14-2388) ("With the State's theory, we know what marriage means (recognition and regulation
of the preferred mode of begetting and raising children) and have thousands of years of experience to
support it and define its limits.").
89. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 83, at 30.
go. See Julie A. Nice, The Descent of Responsible Procreation: A Genealogy of An Ideology,
45 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 781, 788 (2012) (calling responsible procreation "the last defense standing" for
the marriage bans); Jeffrey Rosen, The Laughable Argument Against Gay Marriage, NEW REPUBLIC
(Mar. 26, 2013), https://newrepublic.com/article/i 12778/supreme-court-gay-marriage-case-2013-
laughable-argument ("Because the real reasons that motivated California voters to oppose gay
marriage have been ruled out of bounds by the Court, [defenders of the state's ban] ... have been
forced to rest their entire case on the state's interest in promoting 'responsible procreation."').
91. E.g., Brief for Respondent, supra note 83, at 16-17 (arguing that a federal constitutional rule
requiring Ohio to recognize out of state same-sex marriages would undermine federalism).
92. E.g., id. at 2T ("Each State's people, through representatives or referenda, retain authority to decide
most policy questions.").
93. E.g., Brief for Mich. Defendants-Appellants, supra note 77, at 41("A rational voter might worry
about the law of unintended consequences, and might conclude that there is some risk that changing the
definition of marriage to remove its inherent connection to procreation might undermine the value of
marriage in the long term .... ").
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another of the "responsible procreation" argument was almost always at
the center.
The pedigree of the responsible procreation argument suggests that
it was developed at least in part as a way of diverting attention away
from the negative legislative and public attitudes that had marked the
discourse over gay marriage (and gay rights generally) in the 1990s but
which could not be defended under the Court's more recent cases. 94
Responsible procreation added substance to the inherently circular
argument that, because marriage has long been defined in Western
culture as exclusively heterosexual, it should therefore continue to be
defined that way." According to one account, the basis for the
responsible procreation argument in defense of the marriage bans "first
surfaced in the 1990s in law review articles and presentations" by two
legal academics associated with social conservative causes and litigation,
Lynn Wardle and Teresa Collett.
For many of their opponents, the same-sex marriage bans seemed to
be based on little more than anti-gay animus. But the states may have
calculated that federal courts, including the Supreme Court, would be
reluctant to strike down the laws on that basis because doing so might be
perceived as attributing bigotry to millions of voters and legislators (even
though indicia that a law represents official government animus do not
depend on the subjective motives of individual voters or legislators)."
And so, the central role of responsible procreation in the marriage
litigation suggests a gamble by states that, so long as nothing more
stringent than rational basis review was held to apply, courts were unlikely
to strike down marriage bans based on a finding of improper purpose
standing alone, and that one or more elaborately developed hypothesized
purposes would survive the deferential form of ends/means analysis the
states argued must apply in these cases. After all, a few judges, especially
in early state court marriage cases, readily embraced the "responsible
procreation" argument and deemed it sufficient grounds for dismissing
suits brought by gay and lesbian couples seeking to marry.
But this strategy proved risky, and lower federal courts often balked
at the flimsiness and illogic of the responsible procreation argument. In
his Seventh Circuit opinion striking down Indiana's gay marriage ban,
94. See Carpenter, supra note 59, at 187.
95. See Nice, supra note 90, at 787-88.
96. Rosen, supra note 90.
97. See Carpenter, supra note 59, at 243 (describing animus analysis as relying on objective factors
such as "considerations of text, context, legislative procedure and history, actual effects, and pretext.").
98. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d I 3 (N.Y. 2oo6) (plurality opinion) ("The Legislature
could find that unstable relationships between people of the opposite sex present a greater danger that
children will be born into or grow up in unstable homes than is the case with same-sex couples, and thus
that promoting stability in opposite-sex relationships will help children more."); Morrison v. Sadler,
821 N.E.2d 15,24 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
673
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Judge Richard Posner provided an especially tart critique of the
argument that banning gay marriage was necessary to promote responsible
heterosexual procreation:
Indiana's government thinks that straight couples tend to be sexually
irresponsible, producing unwanted children by the carload, and so must be
pressured (in the form of governmental encouragement of marriage
through a combination of sticks and carrots) to marry, but that gay
couples, unable as they are to produce children wanted or unwanted, are
model parents-model citizens really-so have no need for marriage.
Heterosexuals get drunk and pregnant, producing unwanted children;
their reward is to be allowed to marry. Homosexual couples do not
produce unwanted children; their reward is to be denied the right to
marry. Go figure."
In Obergefell, the Supreme Court rejected the "responsible
procreation" theory in one paragraph, calling it "wholly illogical to believe
that state recognition of the love and commitment between same-sex
couples will alter the most intimate and personal decisions of opposite-sex
couples,"'o and saying the theory "rests on a counterintuitive view of
opposite-sex couple's decisionmaking processes regarding marriage and
parenthood.""" Although the Court did not evaluate the responsible
procreation theory under the methodology of equal protection, we can
infer that the Court would not have found the theory to survive even
rational basis review.
But this passage from Obergefell feels like something of a cheat. It
states a conclusion, not an analysis. The Court did not seriously engage
with the outsized role that hypothesized purposes had played in the
states' defense of their marriage bans, and it thus missed an opportunity
to consider how hypothesized purposes can be abused and how to
impose some discipline on their use.
III. COULD THE COURT HAVE ANALYZED THE SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE BANS FOR ANIMUS?
State officials defending their mini-DOMAs frequently pointed to
what they characterized as a robust and admirable public debate over
same-sex marriage." Yet despite these encomia to the democratic
process, the defendants' briefs were typically devoid of almost any
discussion about the specifics of the debate over same-sex marriage that
99. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 662 (7th Cir. 2014).
too. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584. 2607 (2015) (quoting Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193.
T223 (ioth Cir. 2014)).
101. Id.
T02. See, e.g., Brief for Mich. Respondents at i0, DeBoer v. Snyder, 135 S. Ci. 1040 (2015) (No. 14-571)
("The liberty to engage in self-government is the fundamental right at stake in this case.... The issue of how
to define marriage has been subject to a vigorous debate that is still ongoing.... [and] should continue
without judicial interference.").
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had occurred in their states. For example, while Michigan's brief to the
Supreme Court in Obergefell repeatedly invoked the right of voters to
participate in a democratic process of deciding their state's marriage
laws, the closest it came to connecting this process with actual reasons for
why voters banned gay marriage in 2004 was when it asserted, without
citation to any evidence, that voters had "recognized that what makes
marriage unique is the capacity to create children."' 3
Such reticence raises suspicion. After all, the issue of marriage
equality has had a very high profile in American politics and law since
the 199os, and the history and circumstances of the state marriage bans
were familiar to virtually everyone who participated in the litigation over
their constitutionality. As the Supreme Court would observe in Obergefell,
same-sex marriage had been the subject of "referenda, legislative
debates, and grassroots campaigns, as well as countless studies, papers,
books, and other popular and scholarly writings."". Indeed, Michigan's
brief said the "vigorous debate" over gay marriage was "still ongoing. "
Yet the briefs of the states in the Supreme Court revealed virtually
nothing about the substance of this debate. Reading these briefs, one
might have concluded that the public record was almost entirely devoid
of explanations for why legislators and voters had decided to ban same-
sex marriage.
In fact, the state defendants had good reasons to avoid discussing
the history, context, and effects of the marriage bans, because such an
inquiry would have yielded considerable evidence from which animus
could be inferred. Some of that evidence is relevant to this Part because,
before proceeding to assess the use of hypothesized purposes as a
doctrinal question, it is useful to briefly consider how and why the
marriage bans actually came to be. A full-blown equal protection
analysis-the sort that a stronger opinion in Obergefell could have
provided-is beyond the scope of this Article. But even a quick appraisal
of the actual purposes of the marriage bans will put us in a better
position to understand why states were forced to make such aggressive
use of hypothesized purposes and to assess whether the use of such
justifications was appropriate. The discussion in this Part paves the way
for points made in later Parts regarding the framing of discriminatory
classifications,"6 the difference between hypothesized purposes and post
hoc rationalizations, o7 the relationship between hypothesized purposes
103. Id. at 4.
T04. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2605.
T05. Brief for Mich. Respondents, supra notC 102, at 1O.
io6. See infra Part IV.A.
TO7. See infra Part IV.B.
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and animus analysis,"8 and about the relationship between hypothesized
purposes and direct democracy.""
In assessing the marriage bans for animus, the following arguments
draw on the framework suggested by Professor Carpenter, the leading
expositor of the Court's animus cases. Government action is animus "when,
to a material degree, it aims 'to disparage and to injure"' or reflects "the
simple desire to harm (in a tangible and/or intangible way) [a] group of
people.""" Carpenter explains, "[t]he inference that animus was a
material influence in the government's decision is drawn from a totality
of the evidence rather than from a mechanical rule."" The relevant
factors include:
* statutory text;
* "the political and legal context of passage, including a historical
background demonstrating past discriminatory acts, and a departure
from the usual substantive considerations governing the decision";
* "the legislative proceedings, including evidence of animus that can be
gleaned from the sequence of events that led to passage, the legislative
procedure, and the legislative history accompanying passage";
* "the law's harsh real-world impact or effects, including injury to the
tangible or dignitary interests of the disadvantaged group"; and
* "the utter failure of alternative explanations to offer legitimate ends
along with means that really advance those ends.""
I focus on history, context, and effects. First, then, consider some history and
the context in which the state bans on same-sex marriage were enacted.
A. THE REACTIVE NATURE OF THE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE BANS
The contemporary controversy over same-sex marriage shows a
pattern: The statutory and constitutional bans on gay marriage that
began in the 1970s and accelerated in the 1990s and 2000S were enacted
in reaction to advancements gays and lesbians were making in state
courts, legislatures, and American culture." Laws underscoring the
traditional definition of marriage were enacted in response to a concrete
social phenomenon: Gays and lesbians had begun seeking-and, in some
states, would eventually begin winning-marriage rights.
Although opposite-sex marriage had always been assumed in all
states, no state expressly defined marriage as a union between a man and
To8. See infra Part V.
109. See infra Part VI.
T TO. Carpenter, supra note 59, at T86.
iii. Id. at 245.
TT2. Id. at 245-46.
113. For treatment of this history, see generally MICHAEL J. KiLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ATTAR:
CouRTs. BACKLASH. AND lilt STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SLx MARRIAGE (2013) (documenting the history of the
marriage equality movement).
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a woman before Maryland did so in 1973 "in an apparent response to
attempts by same-sex couples to obtain marriage licenses.".. 4 Two
decades later, in 1993, a decision of the Hawaii Supreme Court in Baehr
v. Lewin'" looked as though it might make Hawaii the first state to allow
legal same-sex marriage. Same-sex marriage was not ultimately legalized
in Hawaii due to a constitutional amendment approved by the state's
voters."6 But Baehr set off a rapid series of "backlash measures" that
became a "mainstay of the [same-sex marriage] controversy.""7 "Objecting
that 'some radical judges in Hawaii may get to dictate the moral code for
the entire nation,' conservative groups provided like-minded legislators
in every state with draft bills to deny recognition to gay marriages
lawfully performed elsewhere."". In the Spring of 1996, "Republicans
introduced so-called defense-of-marriage bills in thirty-four state
legislatures.""' Between 1995 and 20o3-a period when same-sex marriage
was not yet legal in any state-thirty-seven states "passed measures
restricting marriage for same-sex couples in one way or another, and the
measures generally passed by wide margins."
Republicans in Congress also introduced and secured passage of the
federal Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA"), which denied recognition
by the federal government to any same-sex marriage and also purported
to authorize states to do so.2 The congressional debate over DOMA
helped set the tone that would dominate later state legislative and
referendum debates over marriage equality. As legal historian Michael
Klarman has written:
Although the debate over DOMA was ostensibly about gay marriage, it
quickly devolved into a general attack on homosexuality. Many
Republican lawmakers declared that homosexuality was morally wrong
and that the state should not endorse it. Some speakers went further,
denouncing homosexuality as a perversion and comparing it with
polygamy and pedophilia."'
T 14. Kevin Rector, Md. Attorney General Says Supreme Court Must Overturn Same-Sex Marriage Bans
Nationwide, BAji. SUN (Mar. 9, 2015, 4:00 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/features/gay-in-maryland/gay-
matters/bs-gm-attorncy-gencral-issues-report-calling-samesex-marriage-bans-2015309-story.html.
1'5. See Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 645 (1993).
116. WILLIAM B. RUBENSIIN L AL.. CASES AND MAILRIALS ON SLXUAL ORILNIAIION AND 11 LAW 612
(3d ed. 2008).
1 17. Jane S. Schacter, Courts and the Politics of Backlash: Marriage Equality Litigation, Then and Now,
82 S. CAL. L. REV. T153, 1154 (2009).
it8. KLARMAN, supra note 1 3, at 59.
T 9. Id.
T20. Schacter, supra note 117, at 1185.
121. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682-83 (2013).
T22. KIARMAN, supra noteI T3, at 61.
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The public reaction against same-sex marriage intensified after a
2003 ruling by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court brought legal
123
marriage equality to the first American state.
Court decisions not only made gay marriage salient but also made people
aware of how much change had recently occurred on other gay rights
issues. Other legal reformsuch as state laws forbidding discrimination
based on sexual orientation, court decisions permitting gays to adopt
children, and local government ordinances providing partnership benefits
to gay couplesid not attract the same media attention as did judicial
decisions on gay marriage. For many religious conservatives, therefore,
Goodridge served as a slap in the face, forcing them to acknowledge the
dramatic changes in attitudes and legal practices regarding sexual
orientation that had occurred in recent decades.1 24
The fact that the state gay marriage bans were the results of backlash
does not, in itself, condemn them as products of governmental animus. No
doubt many people who supported the bans did so out of reasonable and
good faith convictions about proper public policy regarding marriage. But
the rapid and successful enactment of the bans in response to incipient
social change on gay and lesbian rights casts doubt on the idea that these
laws were the result of a fair and thoughtful public dialogue. The
opposition of individual legislators and voters to same-sex marriage, which
in itself is entitled to respect under the Constitution, fueled a larger
political project to inscribe official malice toward homosexuality into law.
B. WEDGE-ISSUE POLITICS
Beginning in the mid-1990s and accelerating during the 2000S, the
Republican Party exploited same-sex marriage as a political wedge issue,
one that "divided Democrats, united Republicans, and pushed most
independents to the right.",2, "For Republicans," legal historian Klarman
has written, "gay marriage was a dream issue: it both mobilized their base
of religious conservatives and aligned them with most swing voters.1"b The
party recognized that "[a]nti-gay posturing was an easy way for Republican
candidates to demonstrate support for religious conservatives[,]" while at
the same time, "[n]o sizable openly gay constituency existed within the party
to induce Republican candidates to modulate their positions."I27
Republican senators and President George W. Bush publicly
campaigned for an amendment to the federal Constitution that would
123. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (2003).
T24. KIARMAN, supra note IT3, at 165-66.
125. William Saletan, The Marriage Trap, SLATE (May 15, 2012. 9:22 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/
news-and-politics/politics/2012/05/gay marriage-divides republicans as polls shiftithegop-callsit divisiv
c html.
126. KLARMAN, supra note 113, at 59.
T 27. Id. at 6o.
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have banned gay marriage altogether.1" Bush used his bully pulpit as
president to disparage gay and lesbian relationships, declaring that
"changing the definition of marriage would undermine the family
structure."'2 One news account at the time noted, "[m]any Republicans
support the measure because they say traditional marriage strengthens
society; others don't but concede the reality of election-year politics."'3"
Such an amendment would have preempted constitutions and family law
in every state to impose a federal definition of marriage as "only of the
union of a man and a woman.".
The fact that such an idea was endorsed by a sitting president,
embraced by a major political party, and seriously discussed in both the
Senate and the House of Representatives (before ultimately failing in
both chambers) is evidence that the controversy over gay marriage has
not been merely a debate about deferring to the democratic process in
each state. The debate was about whether same-sex marriage was an evil
that government should take extraordinary measures to attack.
C. NEGATIVE PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD GAYS AND LESBIANS
While motives of individual voters or legislators cannot be assessed,
it is possible to consider how public attitudes in the aggregate helped
drive enactment of the same-sex marriage bans. For most of the period
when the state bans were enacted, public attitudes were hostile toward
homosexuality and same-sex relationships. As three sociologists concluded
based on their study of public opinion data, "at the public level, opposition
to same-sex marriage is strongly-very much so-linked to moral and
religious disapproval, or animus.""'
Americans who oppose same-sex marriage typically do not count same-sex
couples as a family. Three-fourths (75%) of those who strongly oppose
same-sex marriage exclude all same-sex couples from the definition of
family, while an additional one-sixth (17%) include same-sex couples only
if they have children. In contrast, respondents who support same-sex
marriage are much more likely to include same-sex couples in their
definitions of family. These patterns belie the claim that animus is not
implicated in opposition to same-sex marriage. Instead, opposition to
same-sex marriage appears rooted in a disapproval of homosexuality, or at
least the belief that same-sex relationships are less legitimate (i.e.,
"inferior" or "of lesser worth") than other family forms."'
128. Saletan, supra note 125.
T29. Assoc. PREss, Bush Urges Federal Marriage Amendment, NBC NEWs (June 5, 2006, 8:22 PM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/i 144271o/ns/politics/t/bush-urges-federal-marriage-amendment/#.VtDWh-
aULhU.
130. Id.
131. S.J. Res. 40, To8th Cong., 2d Scss. (2004).
132. Brian Powell et al., Public Opinion, the Courts, and Same-Sex Marriage: Four Lessons Learned,
2 Soc. CURRENTS 3, 7 (2015).
T33. Id. at 5-6.
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Of course, voters are perfectly entitled to disapprove of gay individuals
and their relationships on moral or religious grounds. But if such
attitudes are aggregated and translated into official policy that can fairly
be imputed to the government, then the Constitution properly comes
into play. To survive constitutional review, a law must have some valid
purpose other than expressing the government's moral or religious
disapproval.
D. THE TONE OF THE CAMPAIGNS
The campaigns for voter-approved mini-DOMAs often played on
pejorative attitudes and stereotypes about gays and lesbians. Constitutional
conclusions cannot be drawn solely from political rhetoric, but the tone
of the debate, where it consistently reflects a desire to disparage and
subordinate the affected group, should be one element that informs
constitutional analysis.
For example, in the "Official Argument or Explanation" for Ohio's
mini-DOMA in 2004, voters were instructed to "[v]ote YES... to
preserve in Ohio law the universal, historic institution of marriage as the
union of one man and one woman, and to protect marriage against those
who would alter and undermine it." 34 Ohio voters were also told the
measure would "restrict[] governmental bodies in Ohio from using your
tax dollars to give official status, recognition and benefits to homosexual
and other deviant relationships that seek to imitate marriage."' 15
In 2008, California voters approved an amendment to their state
constitution, Proposition 8, which banned gay marriage. A 201o federal
district court decision striking down Proposition 8 made findings of fact,
drawn from trial evidence, that included the following: "The Proposition
8 campaign relied on fears that children exposed to the concept of same-
sex marriage may become gay or lesbian[]" and that "parents should
dread having a gay or lesbian child";' 6 and "[t]he campaign to pass
Proposition 8 relied on stereotypes to show that same-sex relationships
are inferior to opposite-sex relationships." 7
History and context like that just described can shed light on
whether a law manifests or was impelled by animus, but so can a law's
harsh or unusual effects. Here, too, the mini-DOMAs should have raised
judicial suspicion.
134. Amicus Brief of the Cleveland Choral Arts Ass'n Inc. at 3-4, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584
(2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574) (citing "Argument and Explanation in Support of the Marriage
Protection Amendment (Issue i)" (emphasis added)).
135. Id. at 4.
136. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 988 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
137. Id. at 990.
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E. CHANGING ORDINARY RULES OF INTERSTATE MARRIAGE RECOGNITION
An underappreciated aspect of the mini-DOMAs was that they not
only prohibited the creation of new same-sex marriages, in most cases
they were also understood to nullify-that is, to deny any legal recognition
to-existing same-sex marriages among a state's citizens, even marriages
that had migrated from other states and had not been procured
evasively., These nonrecognition provisions created a selective
exception to the longstanding rule in every state that "[o]rdinarily,
marriages that are valid where they are celebrated are valid everywhere,
for all purposes."
The human impact of these nonrecognition provisions was significant.
By the time of the 2010 Census, when most of the mini-DOMAs were in
place, more than 130,000 same-sex couples in the United States reported
being married. 4 ' As a result of the mini-DOMAs, married same-sex
couples moving from one state to another "face[d] the prospect of
wrenching disruption in their lives, loss of parental and property rights,
and an array of other problems and indignities, large and small, that a
rational legal regime should not tolerate." 4 '
A law banning same-sex marriage may be a means for government
to express a preference for heterosexual marriage. But going further to
nullify existing marriages seems gratuitously cruel, especially for couples
who did not evade their own state's marriage laws but who had simply
married in a former domicile where it was legal to do so. As a matter of
objective purpose, imposing such an unusual hardship on same-sex
couples indicated that legislators and voters must have regarded same-
sex marriage as odious and worthy of official governmental condemnation,
a grave danger that required extraordinary departures from a long-
settled rule of interstate comity.
F. ALTERING THE POLITICAL PROCESS
The criteria for marriage are typically governed by ordinary family
law statutes. Yet most prohibitions on same-sex marriage came in the
form of state constitutional amendments. Opponents of gay marriage
resorted to state constitutional amendments for two reasons: (i) to overturn
or foreclose pro-marriage equality decisions by state courts applying
138. Steve Sanders, The Constitutional Right to (Keep Your) Same-Sex Marriage, iio Mii. L. REV.
142T, 1423 (2012) ("The vast majority of mini-DOMAs not only forbid the creation of same-sex marriages
but their statutory or constitutional language would also void or deny recognition to the perfectly valid
same-sex marriages of couples who migrate from states where such marriages are legal.").
139. Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public Policy, 76 Trx. L. REV.
921, 922 (1998).
140. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Census Bureau Releases Estimates of Same-Sex Married
Couples (Sept. 27, 2011), http://20o.census.gov/news/releases/operations/chi -cni8i.html.
141. Sanders, supra note 138, at 1425.
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state constitutional law, and (2) to make it more difficult for the bans to be
revisited at a later time through the ordinary legislative political process.
Objectively, it was a purpose of the mini-DOMAs to impose this
unusual political process burden. Even if they could be justified as
attempts by voters to assert control of their own state constitutional law,
the effect of these amendments was to distort the ordinary legislative
lawmaking process to the disadvantage of gays and lesbians. Under the
normal political process, supporters of same-sex marriage would need to
persuade a simple majority of their elected lawmakers. But after a
constitutional mini-DOMA, supporters of same-sex marriage would need
to muster the extraordinary effort and resources to re-amend their state
constitution. Thus, there was a note of disingenuousness in arguments
that marriage equality proponents should use ordinary democratic
methods of politics and persuasion, not courts, to achieve their goals. As
I have argued elsewhere:
Collectively, the state constitutional mini-DOMAs were not merely benign
initiatives to assert majoritarian democratic control over the definition of
marriage. The central political process problem of the mini-DOMAs is
that they were not intended simply to enact marriage discrimination, but
rather to freeze it in place indefinitely; to permanently disadvantage the
group seeking to marry; to effectively shut down the legislative and legal
debate over marriage equality just as it was getting off the ground; and to
insulate the question from future legislative reconsideration or state
judicial review."4
G. IMPOSING UNUSUAL LEGAL DISADVANTAGES ON SAME-SEX COUPLES
Most of the state constitutional mini-DOMAs went beyond defining
marriage to also prohibit other forms of legal relationship recognition for
same-sex couples, such as civil unions or domestic partnership benefits.i 3
Three of the four states whose bans were at issue in Obergefell followed
this pattern. Kentucky's amendment provided that "[a] legal status
identical or substantially similar to that of marriage for unmarried
individuals shall not be valid or recognized." 4 4 Michigan's amendment
specified "the union of one man and one woman in marriage shall be the
only agreement recognized as a marriage or similar union for any
purpose." 4 5 And Ohio's amendment stated that the "state and its political
142. Steve Sanders, Mini-DOMAs as Political Process Failures: The Case for Heightened Scrutiny of State
Anti-Gay Marriage Amendments, 109 Nw. U. L. Rjv. ONLINL 12, 19 (2014). Opponents of gay rights had
long cmployed ballot initiatives and other forms of direct democracy. As one journalist noted in 2012, Jolf
the 33 times states have voted on gay marriage ballot measures since 1998, opponents of gay marriage have
won 32 times." Charles Mahtesian, The Map of Gay Marriage, Porrrco (May 4, 2012, 10:50 PM), http://
www.politico.com/blogs/charlie-mahtesian/2012/05/the-map-of-gay-marriage-122535.
143. See The Difference Between Super-DOMAs and Mini-DOMAs, DANPINEILO.COM, http://
www.danpinello.com/SuperDOMAs.htm (last visited Mar. T1, 2017).
144. Ky. CONSI. pt. II, § 233A.
145. MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 25.
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subdivisions shall not create or recognize a legal status for relationships
of unmarried individuals that intends to approximate the design,
qualities, significance or effect of marriage.,,I
6
From the breadth of these amendments, one could infer that voters
were not merely concerned with maintaining the traditional definition of
marriage; they also believed it was necessary for their state governments
to prevent gays and lesbians from achieving any form of legal recognition
of their relationships. It is unnecessary to examine subjective questions
about voters' motives in order to conclude that an objective purpose of
these mini-DOMAs was to impose a harsh and unusual legal
disadvantage on gays and lesbians.
To sum up Parts III.A through III.G, from the evidence presented
above, the Supreme Court, had it engaged in a traditional equal protection
analysis in Obergefell, could have concluded that the state bans on gay
marriage were the products of a lawmaking process impelled by animus
(based on their history and context) and constituted official government
expressions of animus (based on their effects). The mere possibility of
legal gay marriage was seen as a crisis that demanded a response. This
response did not emerge organically in each state, but swept the country
in an atmosphere of hostility toward homosexuality, one that was often
driven by partisan politics. The effects of the mini-DOMAs-nullifying
existing marriages, distorting the ordinary political process, and banning
legal relationships other than marriage-support the conclusion that
these measures were not merely meant to preserve a traditional
definition of marriage, but to inflict harm arising from irrational prejudice.
This Article so far has focused not on the subjective motives of
individual lawmakers and voters, but rather, on how and why the mini-
DOMAs were adopted and what they actually accomplished as an
objective matter of government purpose. The goal in this Part has not
been to write the definitive account of what Obergefell should have
said, 7 or even to provide a comprehensive animus analysis. Some might
well disagree with my points of emphasis or have a more sympathetic
interpretation of the evidence."' But that does not undermine the point
sought to be made in this Part: The factual basis for the purposes of bans
on same-sex marriage was readily available for judicial review, and thus
hypothesized purposes were unnecessary to understand them.
146. OHITO CONST. art. XV, § IT.
147. Other scholars have been actively engaged on that question. See, e.g., Douglas NeJaime &
Reva Siegcl, What Obergefell v. Hodges Should Have Said, Concurring Opinion (Jack Balkin ed.
forthcoming 2017).
148. E.g., Eric Berger, Same-Sex Marriage, Heightened Scrutiny and the Problem of "Animus," JURIST
(Mar. 2T, 2015, 4:43 PM), http://jurist.org/academic/20T5/03/cric-bcrger-samesex-marriages.php.
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IV. HYPOTHESIS VS. FANTASY
The preceding Parts of this Article sought to describe some of the
actual, non-hypothesized history, context, and effects of the mini-
DOMAs, as well as how the hypothesized purpose of responsible
procreation was developed. We can now turn to what the experience of
the federal marriage litigation teaches for equal protection's rational
basis doctrine-specifically, what lessons can be drawn from the state
government defendants' use and abuse of hypothesized purposes.
The first lesson should be that a proper equal protection analysis
requires a court to focus not just on the discrimination the plaintiff is
alleging, but also on the action that the government has deliberately
taken to cause the discrimination. Failure to focus on the timing and
circumstances of the classification makes it easier for the government to
explain away discrimination by resorting to post hoc rationalizations
(such as the invented purpose of promoting responsible procreation). As
the term is used in this Article, a post hoc rationalization is a particularly
extreme form of hypothesized purpose. It does not involve hypothesis
and speculation about what a legislature or voters actually might have
been aiming to achieve when they enacted a law. Rather, a post hoc
rationalization is a purpose that has been entirely fabricated for use in
litigation to attempt to save a law that might otherwise be found
unconstitutional.
A. ACCURATELY FRAMING THE CLASSIFICATION
The first step in an equal protection analysis should be to identify the
exact form or nature of the classification at issue. 49 And so we should ask:
What exactly were the plaintiffs in the marriage cases challenging?
Were they challenging the longstanding, traditional understanding of
marriage as a union between one man and one woman, an understanding
that was reflected in state common law and whose purpose had a wide
range of possible biological, cultural, religious, and economic explanations?
Or, were they challenging the more recent, deliberate, affirmative
exclusions of gays and lesbians from marriage that states wrote into their
statutes and constitutions?
The question is a crucial one, because it goes to the nature of the
discrimination at issue and the legitimacy of courts stepping in to address
it. If the marriage plaintiffs were challenging the traditional understanding
of marriage that had been broadly accepted in American law and culture
for more than 200 years and in the common law for even longer, then
their cases should have been more difficult. The long-assumed
understanding of marriage as solely a union between a man and woman
149. ERWIN CIILMLRINSKY, CONSTITUIONAL LAW 718 (3d ed. 2009) ("Equal protection analysis always
must begin by identifying how the government is distinguishing among people.").
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could be understood as, in effect, a rule that had evolved over time and
which served a variety of legitimate governmental purposes, such as
"ensuring that children are conceived by a mother and father committed
to raising them in the stable conditions of a lifelong relationship."." Seen
this way, the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage would be an
incidental effect of the marriage definition, but not its actual purpose. It
would be a matter not of intentional discrimination, but disparate impact,
and the difference between those two things is central to modern equal
protection analysis. In equal protection doctrine, discriminatory impact is
of no consequence as long as it results from a law that serves some valid
purpose.' Where a law serves a neutral, legitimate purpose and its
discriminatory effects are unintended, equal protection challenges are
effectively dead on arrival. Only when laws intentionally discriminate do
they become a proper subject for equal protection analysis. Of course,
under rational basis review, even most intentional discrimination gets a
pass if it serves a valid public purpose and does not represent an official
governmental expression of animus. But in cases of intentional
discrimination, courts are entitled to "insist on knowing the relation
between the classification adopted and the object to be attained."
Notwithstanding the actual history of the mini-DOMAs, the states
in Obergefell and other marriage cases maintained that their bans on gay
marriage should be understood not as intentional anti-gay discrimination
but as a neutral rule reflecting the traditional understanding of marriage.
The negative impact on gays and lesbians was merely incidental, they
claimed, and thus did not present an equal protection problem."
This distinction-between inherited understandings that have the
incidental effect of creating disadvantage for a group, and recent
enactments that intentionally classify-has escaped attention in case law
and scholarship.1 54 But the distinction is a critical one for equal protection
analysis.
A form of discrimination can be made to appear less invidious when
it is characterized as arising passively from a broad and diffuse backdrop
150. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2613 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
151. E.g., Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273-74 (1979) ([T]he Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees equal laws, not equal results.").
152. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
153. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at i i, DeBoer v. Snyder, 135 S. Ct. 1040 (6th Cir. 2014) (No. 14-
1341) ("Responding to the reality that a man and a woman are generally able to create new life neither
discriminates nor entails animus at all."); Brief and Required Short Appendix of Appellants at 25,
Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7 th Cir. 2014) (Nos. 14-2386, 14-2387. 14-2388 ) ("While traditional
marriage laws impact heterosexuals and homosexuals differently, they do not create classifications based
on sexuality, particularly considering the benign history of traditional marriage laws generally.").
154. The matter seems related to similar problems in substantive due process where the meaning
of, and therefore the constitutional protection given to, a right can depend on how it is characterized
or the level of abstraction at which it is viewed. See Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of
Generality in the Definition ofRights, 57 U. Cm. L. REV. T057 (1990).
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of history. But where an inherited understanding is translated into a
deliberate, contemporary classification, there is no sound reason for a
court not to focus on the most recent legislative action. The Supreme
Court has said that "equal protection analysis puts its emphasis on the
permissibility of an enactment's classifications."' In assessing a law under
equal protection, a court "must consider the facts and circumstances
behind the law," in addition to "the interests which the State claims to be
protecting, and the interests of those who are disadvantaged by the
classification."' 6 But a candid and thorough analysis of such facts,
circumstances, and interests is not possible if a court does not focus on
the actual timing and circumstances of the classificatory act that the
plaintiff is challenging.
The point here is not to suggest that longstanding, inherited forms
of discrimination-such as, for example, the stereotypes about women's
roles that were once deeply embedded in law-cannot be constitutionally
attacked; obviously they can and should be. Rather, the point is that
where a social consensus is still emerging about whether a particular
form of discrimination is wrongful, the long history or common law roots
of a social or legal practice may be part of the government's explanation
for why the discrimination it produces continues to be tolerable. But if
the plaintiff is challenging a more recent classificatory enactment, then
the two should not be confused. The government should be required to
explain why a classification was thought necessary at the time the
classification was enacted. Doing so does not preclude the use of
hypothesized purposes to justify a law. But a court may well view
hypothesized purposes as less necessary and acceptable when it is
examining a recent legislative action rather than a practice that emerges
from the mists of history.
The clarity and rigor with which a classification is identified, then
analyzed, has important implications for the legitimacy of courts
adjudicating constitutional claims. By deciding Obergefell primarily as a
matter of substantive due process, rather than equal protection, Justice
Kennedy's majority opinion did not focus on the circumstances under
which the mini-DOMAs had been enacted. The Court said the marriage
bans "demean[ed]" gays and lesbians and imposed "stigma and injury of
the kind prohibited by our basic charter."' 7 But the Court provided no
examination of the circumstances under which the bans arose, much less
a search for purpose within those circumstances. Consequently, it is all
too easy to dismiss the Court's statements about insult and stigma as little
more than subjective and contestable conclusions about social meaning.
155. Victh v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 3T5 (2004) (emphasis added).
156. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968) (emphasis added).
157. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015).
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The majority's failure to frame the gay marriage bans as intentional
classifications that the states should be required to justify left it
vulnerable to the meme that, as the dissent by Chief Justice Roberts put
it, "[f]ive lawyers have closed the debate" over gay marriage, "relegat[ed]
ages of human experience with marriage to a paragraph or two," and
"enacted their own vision of marriage as a matter of constitutional
law."' As he saw the matter, the understanding of marriage as limited to
heterosexuals "arose in the nature of things to meet a vital need:
ensuring that children are conceived by a mother and father committed
to raising them in the stable conditions of a lifelon relationship." 5 9 It
was validated by "ages of human experience." A definition of
"marriage that has persisted in every culture throughout human history,"
he said, "can hardly be called irrational.",6 Justice Scalia argued along the
same lines, insisting that the Court had "no basis for striking down a
practice ... that bears the endorsement of a long tradition of open,
widespread, and unchallenged use dating back to the [Fourteenth]
Amendment's ratification.",6 2 Similarly, in the Sixth Circuit, Judge Jeffrey
Sutton said the cases before him represented a challenge to a
"tradition ... measured in millennia" that "until recently had been
adopted by all governments and major religions of the world."' 6 These
characterizations implicitly but unmistakably imputed to the mini-
DOMA challenges an audaciousness that was intended to trivialize them.
But such characterizations were factually and logically misleading.
In the cases that were consolidated into Obergefell, the plaintiffs did not
challenge the abstract concept of a long tradition or a settled
understanding about the nature of marriage. Rather, they challenged
specific, recently enacted positive laws-state constitutional amendments
in Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee. The four amendments at
issue in Obergefell were all recently adopted, either in 2004 (Kentucky,
Michigan, and Ohio) or 2006 (Tennessee). 6 4 Indeed, the history of the
earlier lower court federal marriage litigation similarly leaves no mistake
about what laws the plaintiffs were challenging. The first federal case
challenging a state gay marriage ban, Citizens for Equal Protection v.
Bruning, 6 specifically targeted the Nebraska constitutional mini-DOMA
that the state's voters adopted in 2000.'6 The next federal case, in
158. Id. at 2612 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 2613.
i6o. Id. at 26T2.
161. Id. at 2611.
162. Id. at 2628 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
163. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 396 (6th Cir. 2014).
164. Information about the history of each state's ban is available at Winning in the States, FREEDOM
TO MARRY, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/pages/winning-in-the-states (last visited Mar. 11, 2017).
165. Citizens for Equal Protection Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980. 985 (D. Neb. 2005).
T66. Id.
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Oklahoma, specifically argued that the U.S. Constitution was violated by
a state constitutional marriage ban that state's voters had adopted in
2004. -67 And the high-profile California case of Perry v. Schwarzenegger6 s
came after the state constitutional gay marriage ban Proposition 8 that
California voters adopted in 2008.6
Government defendants have an incentive to blur the distinction
between disparate treatment arising from a longstanding social or legal
practice, on the one hand, and an intentionally discriminatory enactment,
on the other, because doing so can make hypothesized purposes like
"responsible procreation" seem more necessary and acceptable. But
conflating the longstanding pedigree of a social or legal practice with a
recent political decision to enact a classification that reifies that practice
is a rhetorical sleight of hand, not analysis. Even if the common
understanding of marriage for generations did promote responsible
procreation, the states' burden should have been to explain how banning
gay marriage in 1996 or 2004 logically advanced that purpose without
producing an excessive amount of unjustified discrimination.
In the Sixth Circuit opinion that was overturned by Obergefell,
Judge Sutton said the mini-DOMAs represented a decision by voters to
"adhere[] to the traditional definition of marriage." 7" The problem with
this characterization is that traditional marriage did not have a sunset
provision that required voters to periodically decide whether or not to
reaffirm it. In the years preceding Obergefell, whether or not to retain
the traditional definition of marriage was not a question that legislators
and voters were asked in the abstract. Rather, the issue arose only after
gays and lesbians began seeking-and, in some places, winning-the
right to marry or other forms of legal relationship recognition. The mini-
DOMAs represented backlash, an affirmative rejection of gay marriage.7
For example, in the "Official Argument or Explanation" for Ohio's mini-
DOMA in 2004, voters were instructed to "Vote YES ... to preserve in
Ohio law the universal, historic institution of marriage as the union of
one man and one woman, and to protect marriage against those who
would alter and undermine it."1 7 2
A preference for traditional marriage over same-sex marriage could
have been a motive for a vote in favor of one of these measures. But
characterizing the marriage bans as merely representing a decision to
"adhere[] to the traditional definition of marriage"I 73 avoids consideration
167. Bishop v. Okla. ex rel. Edmondson, 447 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1244 (N.D. Okla. 2006).
T68. Perry v. Schwarzcnegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
169. Id. at 927.
170. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 396 (6th Cir. 2014).
171. See supra notes 113-131 and accompanying text.
172. Amicus Brief of the Cleveland Choral Arts Ass'n Inc., supra note 134, at 3-4 (emphasis added).
173. DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 396.
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of the political dynamics (such as those previously discussed in Part III)
that caused the question to be placed in front of legislators and voters and
which ultimately drove the making of official government policy to exclude
gays and lesbians from civil marriage. Without considering such political
dynamics, it is not possible to assess an enactment for improper purpose
or to determine whether it was the product of "a legislative process
impelled by animus."14
A proper focus on the nature and history of the law being challenged
was of central relevance in another of the Court's gay-rights cases,
Lawrence, the 2003 decision that struck down remaining state criminal
laws against sodomy. 7 1 Prohibitions on sodomy-both homosexual and
heterosexual-had existed since colonial times, derived from English
criminal laws going back to the sixteenth century."1 6 These laws "were not
directed at homosexuals as such but instead sought to prohibit
nonprocreative sexual activity more generally."I 7 7 The laws began to fall
away in the late 196os thanks in part to the Model Penal Code.7' New
laws singling out only homosexual sodomy for criminal punishment did
not appear until the late 1970s,"7 a time of nascent gay visibility and
political activism. In Texas, the state where Lawrence arose, sodomy
prohibitions for heterosexuals had been repealed in 1973,"" and the
former sodomy law was redefined and renamed to apply only to
"homosexual conduct."8
The Lawrence Court understood well that it was the 1973 anti-gay
classification, not the ancient common law proscriptions against
nonprocreative sex that the petitioners were challenging. The Court did
not deny that "for centuries there have been powerful voices to condemn
homosexual conduct as immoral," a view that had been "shaped by
religious beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable behavior, and respect
for the traditional family." 8 Those considerations, the Court said, "do not
answer the question before us, however. The issue is whether the majority
may use the power of the State to enforce these views ... through
operation of the criminal law."""
The point is not that discrimination is necessarily more easily
justified under the Constitution if it arises from a longstanding tradition.
Rather, the point is that a more recent, deliberate classificatory action
174. Carpenter, supra note 59, at 184.
175. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
176. Id. at 568.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 572.
179. Id. at 570.
T8o. TEx. GEN. LAWS § 1.03 (1973).
18T. Id. § 2T.06.
182. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571.
183. Id.
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should be more readily susceptible to judicial scrutiny. Statutes and
constitutional amendments do not appear out of nowhere; they are
enacted to address some perceived social or governmental need or problem.
Indeed, a legislative action might, in some cases, save an otherwise
unconstitutional practice by demonstrating a considered and deliberate
legitimate government purpose behind the discrimination."' If the timing
and context of a classification are not properly perceived and framed by
a court, however, then a disciplined analysis of its history, context, and
effects is more difficult. When government defendants are not required
to focus on the facts surrounding an actual classificatory act, they may be
more likely to rely on hypothesized purposes to explain discrimination.
And when the government actually wants to cover up the true purpose of
discrimination, it may require a more extreme form of hypothesized
purpose-the post hoc rationalization-to create the illusion that the
discrimination advances some legitimate government purpose.
B. PosT Hoc RATIONALIZATIONS
Hypothesizing the purpose for a law implies an exercise of
figuratively going back in time and speculating about what was going
through the minds of legislators when they enacted the law. It is
generally a process of inference. A hypothesized purpose need not be the
actual cause of a legislative classification. But common sense indicates
that any purpose should be capable of explaining what theoretically and
plausibly could have caused the classification under the conditions
prevailing, and as a problem could have been perceived, at the time of
enactment. While the government may not be required to "actually
articulate . . . the purpose or rationale supporting its classification," judicial
review "does require that a purpose may conceivably or may reasonably
have been the purpose and policy of the relevant governmental
decisionmaker."
There is, however, another form of hypothesized purpose that is
better characterized as a post hoc rationalization. The purpose of a post
hoc rationalization is not to suggest known facts or considerations that
could have caused a legislative body to enact a classification. Rather, a
post hoc rationalization represents a new, supposedly benign purpose for
a classification, one invented by government lawyers at the time of
litigation and advanced in an attempt to save the classification from
being found unconstitutional. A post hoc rationalization might be
184. E.g., Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 15, 13-16 (1992) (explaining that a local government tax
assessment practice had been enacted "to achieve the benefits of an acquisition-value system," thus giving it a
legitimate purpose that was missing in a similar assessment scheme the Court had found unconstitutional in
an earlier case).
185. Id. at 15.
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consistent with a classification, but it is something that could not plausibly
have caused the legislature to create the classification.
"Responsible procreation" is a good example of a post hoc
rationalization. Looking at the matter as of the time of the litigation
rather than the time of the approval of the gay marriage bans, states
engaged in a process of reverse-engineering in an effort to save their laws
from being held unconstitutional. States did not seriously claim that
legislators or voters might have been responding to an epidemic of
irresponsible, out-of-wedlock procreation at the time they voted to ban
gay marriage. Rather, the states argued that, in the judgment of the
executive branch charged with defending the laws, promoting responsible
procreation was a valid government purpose in the abstract (while, of
course, eliding the question of how limiting marriage to opposite-sex
couples actually served this purpose). For example, in the Sixth Circuit,
Michigan called its arguments about responsible procreation "modest
claims," a theory about a purpose of marriage that "[m]ost people in this
country would probably agree with ... or at least think [was] within the
realm of reasonable debate.",, 6 "It matters not," Ohio's Obergefell brief
stated, "if the reasons offered in court are [actually] the reasons why
lawmakers (or voters) approved the law.", 8 7
The case of Indiana, whose marriage ban was statutory but was never
added to the state constitution,,8" provides a useful study of the difference
between a hypothesized purpose and a post hoc rationalization. Both
houses of the state's legislature approved the ban as an "emergency"
measure on April 25, 1997 .' As with similar laws approved by other states
around this time, the ban was adopted amid concern that same-sex
couples from Indiana might obtain marriages in Hawaii-whose state
courts were at the time considering whether such marriages should be
authorized"9"-then return to Indiana expecting the marriages to be
recognized. According to a news report on the act's passage, "[t]he
controversial issue arose in Indiana after a judge in Hawaii ruled in
December [1996] that Hawaii may not forbid same-sex marriages.", A
scholarly history of Indiana domestic relations law explains that
legislators enacted the law "in an attempt to ensure that homosexual
T86. Brief for Mich. Defendants-Appellants, supra note 77, at 44.
187. Brief for Respondent, supra note 83, at 52 (citing U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179
(1980)).
T88. Part IV argues that hypothesized purposes are inappropriate for actions taken through direct
democracy such as state constitutional amendments.
189. 1997 Ind. Acts (specifying that in § 2 "[a]n emergency is declared for this act.").
190. See generally Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 645 (1993).
191. Stuart A. Hirsch, Ban on Gay Marriages to Go to Governor, INDANAPoITS STAR, Apr. 26, 1997, at
B2; accord Barb Albert, Same-sex Marriage Takes Hit in Senate, INDANAPoITS STAR, Feb. 1I, 1997, at B2
(noting that State Senator Richard Bray "argued that Congress recently decided to allow states to choose
whether to recognize same-sex marriages sanctioned in other locales.").
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Hoosiers could not wed," and that the concern at the time was that "if
any same-sex couple could go to Hawaii to be married, and return to
their home state to live, then Hawaii was strong-arming the other states,
setting marriage policy for the nation.",2 In other words, the purpose of
the law was perfectly clear: to deny recognition to same-sex marriages.
Defending its anti-gay marriage law in the Seventh Circuit U.S.
Court of Appeals in 2014, Indiana did not hypothesize that its legislature
was responding to an epidemic of irresponsible procreation among
heterosexuals. Indeed, the state offered no explanation for what had
caused the legislature to enact the ban. Instead, the state offered what it
called a "theory" of marriage." Marriage, it said, "arises from the need to
protect the only procreative sexual relationship that exists and to make it
more likely that unintended children, among the weakest members of
society, will be cared for."I 9 4 Since homosexuals cannot naturally bear
"unintended children," they are by definition, the state said, outside the
purposes of marriage. "With the State's theory," Indiana told the Seventh
Circuit, "we know what marriage means (recognition and regulation of
the preferred mode of begetting and raising children) and have
thousands of years of experience to support it and define its limits." "
In other words, the state did not attempt to explain or even
hypothesize why legislators had banned gay marriage. It simply sought to
rationalize the state's marriage ban post hoc as being consistent with the
relationship between heterosexual marriage and procreation. The state
focused on the historic definition of marriage rather than the more
recent classificatory act. I explained in the preceding Subpart why such a
move distorts equal protection analysis.
The basic question about post hoc rationalizations is whether they
stretch the rationale for hypothesized purposes too far. Should an
explanation be allowed to justify a classification if it could not, even in
theory, have caused the classification? To be sure, the Supreme Court has
not formally distinguished between hypothesized purposes and post hoc
rationalizations, and the difference between the two may not always be
clear. The Court sometimes has been imaginative when it wants to save a
classification against an equal protection challenge . But even where the
Court has seemed to be reaching, it has usually involved the justices
purporting to fill in gaps in a legislative record, not entirely reimagining
the basic purpose of a statute.
192. Michael Grossberg & Amy Elson, Family Law in Indiana: A Domestic Relations Crossroads, in
THE ImISTORY 01 INDIANA LAW 8o (David J. Bodenhamer & Randall T. Shepard eds., 2006).
193. Brief and Required Short Appendix of Appellants, supra note 153, at 33.
194. Id.
195. Reply Brief for Appellants, supra note 88, at 17-18.
196. Karlan, supra notc To, at 873.
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For example, in McGowan v. MarylandI97 the Court engaged in
speculation while seeking to explain seemingly arbitrary exemptions
from a state's Sunday closing law. "It would seem that a legislature could
reasonably find that the Sunday sale of the exempted commodities was
necessary," the Court said, "either for the health of the populace or for
the enhancement of the recreational atmosphere of the day-that a
family which takes a Sunday ride into the country will need gasoline for
the automobile and may find pleasant a soft drink or fresh fruit . . .." In
Nguyen v. INS, the Court upheld against an equal protection challenge a
federal naturalization statute that treated unmarried fathers differently
than unmarried mothers for purposes of a child's U.S. citizenship."9 The
Court speculated that Congress could have believed that due to the
sexual irresponsibility of some males, there was more likely to be a
meaningful, ongoing bond between a foreign-born child and its mother
than between such a child and its father, even though the facts of the case
did not support such an assumption.
Even if the Court has not always hewed to hypothesized purposes
that were entirely plausible, post hoc rationalizations are at odds with
how the Court has actually described rational basis review in its
statements of doctrine. A law is not unconstitutional unless "it is of such
a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational
basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.",1 A
classification must be reasonable based on "considerations presented to
[the legislature]" and "evidence before the legislature reasonably supporting
the classification."2. A hypothesized purpose must have "footing in the
realities of the subject addressed by the legislation.,2"' 3 The Court has said
its "inquiry is at an end" where "there are plausible reasons for [a
legislative body's] action.",24 What matters is whether the legislative
action "was a rational way to correct" the "evil at hand for correction."211
These descriptions lend support to the principle that, if the requirement of
"plausibility" has any meaning, there should at least be the theoretical
possibility of a causal link between a legislature's action, and the
"considerations" and "evidence" that were "before the legislature," or the
197. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (196 1).
198. Id. at 426.
199. Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
200. Id. at 64-66.
20T. Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 132 S. Ct. 2073, 2080 (2012) (quoting United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938)).
202. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981) (quoting Carolene Prods. Co., 304
U.S. at 154 (alteration in original) (emphasis added)).
203. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993).
204. F.C.C. v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1993) (quoting U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz,
449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (emphasis added)).
205. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1995).
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actual "evil at hand for correction." Even a hypothesized purpose must
"conceivably" or "reasonably have been the purpose and policy of the
relevant governmental decisionmaker." 6
Responsible procreation cannot be squared with these doctrinal
principles. Indeed, in Obergefell the Court dismissed the responsible
procreation argument as "counterintuitive"m' 7 and "wholly illogical.""" No
attorney for a mini-DOMA state could have asserted with a straight face
that the problem of irresponsible heterosexual procreation was on the
radar screens of legislators or voters-that is, "an evil at hand for
correction"-at the time they enacted the same-sex marriage bans. The
fact that marriage and procreation have long been associated does not
suffice to explain the gay marriage bans if the problem of irresponsible
procreation was not plausibly on legislators' or the voters' minds at the
time.
Post hoc rationalizations are especially a problem in cases involving
animus. As illustrated by this Article's discussion of the federal marriage
litigation, their implausibility should make a court suspicious that the real
reasons for the discrimination are improper. But there are arguments that
post hoc rationalizations should be identified as such and skeptically
examined by courts in all rational basis cases. The reasons are as follows.
First, post hoc rationalizations are inconsistent with the Court's
explanations of the work a hypothesized purpose should do in equal
protection analysis. The presumption of constitutionality, a cornerstone
of modern equal protection review, does not mean that where rational
basis review applies a court must seek to uphold a law at all costs.
Rather, the presumption of constitutionality is about judicial deference
to the work of legislatures and not second guessing the policy judgments
of legislators. Judicial deference is owed to legislative policy judgments,
not made-up stories.
Second, hypothesized purposes are meant to fill gaps in a court's
ability to understand the history and context of why a law was adopted.
But, if a legitimate purpose cannot plausibly be hypothesized from actual
facts and circumstances, it becomes more likely that the law was actually
meant to advance some improper purpose. As Judge Patrick Higgenbotham
observed in a recent Fifth Circuit case holding that Louisiana lacked a
rational basis for granting funeral homes the exclusive right to sell
caskets (a case about economic favoritism, not animus), "a hypothetical
rationale, even post hoc, cannot be fantasy," and while government
206. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. T, 15 (1992) (quoting Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S.
522, 528-29 (1959)).
207. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015).
208. Id. (quoting Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F3d IT93, 1223 (Toth Cir. 2014)).
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purposes may be hypothesized, the analysis cannot incorporate "post hoc
hypothesized facts." 2
Third, lawyer-invented post hoc rationalizations raise a separation
of powers issue. The executive branch usually is charged with defending
laws enacted by the legislative branch, not with making new laws.
Plausible hypothesized purposes can be helpful to courts (which
sometimes make up their own hypothesized purposes)2t ' in seeking to
vindicate the presumption of constitutionality and avoid striking down a
law. But when post hoc rationalizations have no plausible causal link to a
classification created by the legislature, the executive branch is empowered
to become, in effect, the law's maker-or at least its co-maker. Allowing
government lawyers to fabricate purposes for a law that lack grounding
in facts and circumstances that actually were before the legislature at the
time of the law's enactment allows the executive to usurp functions that
are inherently legislative. Doing so diminishes legislative accountability
to voters. The same argument could be made about judges-hypothesizing
may be necessary, but the requirement of plausibility imposes limits. Just
as new wine does not belong in old bottles, laws passed by a legislature
should not become the vessels for entirely new purposes created by the
executive's-or the judiciary's- imagination.
Fourth, post hoc rationalizations can help government defendants
avoid a court's focus on the actual classificatory act under review, the
importance of which was discussed in the previous Subpart. Superficially
attractive post hoc rationalizations might distract a court from assessing
what the government has actually done, how it actually has classified.
V. HYPOTHESIZED PURPOSES VS. IMPROPER PURPOSES
In Obergefell, the Supreme Court was presented with an opportunity
to consider what role hypothesized purposes should play when the real
explanation for a classification is alleged to be improper. The Sixth
Circuit had relied heavily on the post hoc rationalization of responsible
procreation as the justification for banning gay marriage"' while it
summarily rejected in two short paragraphs the plaintiffs' arguments that
209. St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 2T5, 223 (5th Cir. 2013) (emphasis added).
210. Professor Dana Berliner argues, however, that this is rare; that the "Supreme Court has never
decided a case involving a government purpose invented by the courts" and thus that "judicially-invented
purposes provide a less than secure footing for law." Dana Berliner, The Federal Rational Basis
Test-Fact and Fiction, 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 373, 387-88 (2016).
2TT. Luke 5:37 (New Int'l Version) ("And no one pours new wine into old wineskins. Otherwise, the
new wine will burst the skins; the wine will run out and the wineskins will be ruined.").
2T2. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 404-05 (6th Cir. 2014) ("Once one accepts a need to... create
stable family units for the planned and unplanned creation of children, one can well appreciate why the
citizenry would think that a reasonable first concern of any society is the need to regulate male-female
relationships and the unique procreative possibilities of them.").
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the gay marriage bans in their states had been impelled by animus."
Throughout the federal marriage litigation, charges of animus were as
central to the arguments of plaintiffs as responsible procreation was to
the arguments of state government defendants. Thus, it seems rather
remarkable that the Supreme Court entirely avoided engaging with this
conflict. This Part offers some principles for the appropriate analysis when
hypothesized purposes are in tension with alleged improper purposes.
A. ANIMUS SCRUTINY IN THE FACE OF HYPOTHESIZED PURPOSES
Because "rational-basis review in equal protection analysis is not a
license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative
choices,".. the Supreme Court has said that we must tolerate possible harm
to a plaintiff when government lawyers tell a court, in effect: We cannot
determine exactly why the legislature drew this classification, but here are
some legitimate purposes we can hypothesize.
But what if the plaintiff can produce evidence that "the disadvantage
imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons affected" 5 or
"irrational prejudice"?"' Are courts expected to ignore such animus as
long as the law can be saved by resting on some hypothesized purpose?
Some of the Court's rhetoric might suggest as much. Under rational basis
review, courts are obligated to uphold a classification if the government
offers "plausible reasons,". even reasons "unsupported by evidence or
empirical data."' If these statements are taken at face value, then can
hypothesized purposes be enlisted into what is, in effect, a cover-up to
prevent a court from considering actual purposes? That is exactly what the
states suggested in Obergefell."'
But in fact, hypothesized purposes cannot rescue a law that has been
corrupted by animus. The Court made this clear in Windsor, turning
aside the U.S. House of Representatives' argument that the federally
enacted DOMA could be saved with post hoc rationalizations.""
Moreover, the inability of a hypothesized purpose to adequately explain
the discrimination caused by a law can be one factor that leads a court to
conclude that animus was at work.
The hallmark of the animus cases has been the Supreme Court's
skepticism toward hypothesized purposes and its willingness to give certain
2T3. Id. at 408.
214. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312. 319 (1993) (internal citation omitted).
215. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996).
216. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432. 450 (1985).
217. F.C.C. v. BCach Commc'ns, Inc., 5o8 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1993).
218. Id. at 315.
219. See supra notes 82-89 and accompanying discussion in text.
220. See infra nOtCS 249-26T and accompanying discussion in text.
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classifications closer, more skeptical examination." In animus cases, "the
Court has teased out impermissible purposes where governmental decision
makers (including legislatures) have claimed permissible ones."222 Moreover,
"[a]nimus is not merely an illegitimate purpose," but also "taints the
government's action. The sometimes far-fetched and hypothesized
rationalizations that suffice to sustain a law in ordinary rational-basis
cases don't suffice once animus is detected." ,2 Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, concurring in the judgment in Lawrence, observed that "[w]hen
a law exhibits ... a desire to harm a politically unpopular group, we have
applied a more searching form of rational basis review to strike down
such laws under the Equal Protection Clause.,,224 Indeed, the Court has
said that highly deferential rational basis review does not apply where a
classification "proceeds along suspect lines,,225 or where a court has been
given "some reason to infer antipathy." 6  Where constitutionally
improper discrimination is alleged, "the mere recitation of a benign,
compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield which protects against
any inquiry into the actual purposes underlying a statutory scheme.,,22
7
In response to Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia's dissent in Lawrence
disapprovingly noted that the "more searching form of rational basis
review" O'Connor posited seems to mean "that laws exhibiting 'a desire
to harm a politically unpopular group' are invalid even though there may
be a conceivable rational basis to support them.,,22" That is true-Justice
Scalia's statement accurately captures the doctrine based on what the
Court has actually said and done. To survive scrutiny, the Court has said,
a law must be both "rationally based and free from invidious
discrimination."229
The Supreme Court has never prescribed a precise methodology for
the analysis of animus, though several commentators have provided
221. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
222. Carpenter, supra note 59, at 243.
223. Id. at 190.
224. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558. 580 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (discussing Moreno,
Cleburne, and Romer). If a more searching form of rational basis review is essentially synonymous with
intermediate scrutiny, which some commentators have asserted, then this suggests that in such situations
there should be something close to a per se rule against accepting hypothesized purposes. See Gayle Lynn
Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 780
(1987) ("IR~ational basis with bite is simply intermediate scrutiny without an articulation of the factors
that triggered it...."). Where intermediate scrutiny applies, "[t]he justification" for a challenged law
"must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation." Unites States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
225. F.C.C. v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).
226. Id. at 314.
227. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975).
228. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 6oi (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).
229. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) (emphasis added).
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useful, in-depth explorations of animus doctrine.2 30 From caselaw and
academic commentary, it is possible to sketch the basic outlines of
animus analysis and its relationship to hypothesized purposes.
Government action is animus "when, to a material degree, it aims
'to disparage and to injure"' or reflects "the simple desire to harm (in a
tangible and/or intangible way) [a] group of people."' Although review
under rational basis "places no affirmative evidentiary burden on the
government, plaintiffs may nonetheless negate a seemingly plausible
basis for the law by adducing evidence of irrationality," 3 2  such as
evidence that the purpose of a law was to project an official government
expression of animus toward a group, or that the process of adopting the
law was impelled by animus. The government can then offer its purposes
for the law, real or hypothesized. At the summary judgment stage, the
court can decide whether the plaintiffs animus allegations raise a
material question of fact.
At this stage, a court may decide that a law so obviously serves a
legitimate government purpose that further analysis is unnecessary. The
Supreme Court has indicated that the anti-animus doctrine primarily
protects groups that have been historically targeted for unjustified
discrimination and subordination,2 3 3 and courts have demonstrated that
they are perfectly capable of dispatching insubstantial or frivolous
allegations of animus.2 3 4 For example, because commonplace laws against
things like burglary or smoking plainly serve legitimate government
interests, it would take an extremely unusual factual record to persuade a
court that such legislation was unconstitutional because it betrayed
animus toward burglars or smokers. If the matter cannot be resolved on
summary judgment, the court may conduct a trial. 5
If the court ultimately rejects allegations of animus, then any
legitimate government purpose, even a hypothesized one, allows the law
to stand. But if the court confirms that animus was a "material" influence
or "substantial factor,23 6 in the government's decision to adopt the law,
then the law fails as unconstitutional. And at that point, a benign-
sounding hypothesized purpose may not be interposed to save it.3 7 Both
commentary and caselaw suggest that once a government purpose to
230. See, e.g., PolIvogt, supra notc 74; Carpenter, supra note 59.
231. Carpenter, supra note 59, at 186.
232. St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 223 (5 th Cir. 2013) (citing F.C.C. v. Beach Commc'ns.
Inc., 5o8 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1993)).
233. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 580 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (discussing Moreno, Cleburne, and
Romer).
234. See, e.g., Loesel v. City of Frankenmuth, 692 F.3d 452, 466-67 (6th Cir. 2012) (rejecting landowner's
claim that local zoning ordinance was enacted out of animus to the landowner).
235. See infra Part V.B.
236. Carpenter, supra note 59, at 232.
237. See infra nOtCS 249-26T and accompanying tcxt.
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intentionally disadvantage a group for no legitimate reason is unmasked,
its tainting effect may override even legitimate government purposes.238
What counts as evidence of animus? The conclusion that animus
was a material or substantial influence behind a law, Professor Dale
Carpenter explains must be "drawn from a totality of the evidence rather
than from a mechanical rule."2 9 The factors include consideration of:
statutory text; "the political and legal context of passage, including a
historical background demonstrating past discriminatory acts, and a
departure from the usual substantive considerations governing the
decision"; "the legislative proceedings, including evidence of animus that
can be gleaned from the sequence of events that led to passage, the
legislative procedure, and the legislative history accompanying passage";
"the law's harsh real-world impact or effects, including injury to the
tangible or dignitary interests of the disadvantaged group"; and "the
utter failure of alternative explanations to offer legitimate ends along
with means that really advance those ends." 24 o
Sometimes a court can readily find animus in a law's purpose from
the basic facts of its text, effects, or legislative history, as the Supreme
Court did in Windsor with the federal Defense of Marriage Act.2 4' Other
times, substantial allegations of animus lead a court to apply a more
demanding version of ends/means analysis-that is, the rationality of the
relationship between the government's purported legitimate purpose
(hypothesized or not) and the law's actual effects. Because of this more
demanding version of ends/means analysis, animus cases are often
characterized as "rational basis with bite."24 2
The Court's animus cases illustrate these principles. In Romer, as
Professor Andrew Koppelman has explained, there was ample basis for
the Court to understand that the Colorado state anti-gay constitutional
amendment at issue in that case (which repealed existing anti-discrimination
protections for gays and lesbians and prohibited their reinstatement at
any level of government), had been impelled by anti-gay animus, even if
the Court's opinion did not expressly highlight evidence of invidious
intent. 243 Accordingly, the Court gave only the most perfunctory
238. Carpenter, supra note 59, at 186 ("If animus [isj present... it taints the law. The act is
unconstitutional even if legitimate reasons might now be offered to justify it." (internal footnote omitted));
see Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 277 (1979) ("Discriminatory intent is simply not amenable
to calibration. It either is a factor that has influenced the legislative choice or it is not.").
239. Carpenter, supra note 59, at 245.
240. Id. at 245-46.
241. See infra notcS 249-262 and accompanying text.
242. See Pettinga, supra note 224, at 780.
243. Andrew Koppelman, Romer v. Evans and Invidious Intent, 6 WM. & MARY Bir RTs. J. (SYvrosIuM
Issuv) 89, 93 (1997) ("Romer is a case about impermissible purpose.... [M]issing pages can easily be filled in
by the reader, who need only take note of the hatred and stereotyping of gays that has been ubiquitous in
American culture for a long time.").
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attention to the state's defenses of the measure: that its purposes were to
safeguard "respect for other citizens' freedom of association, and in
particular the liberties of landlords or employers who have personal or
religious objections to homosexuality" and to "conserv[e] resources to
fight discrimination against other groups." 44 Appropriately regarding
these defenses as merely post hoc rationalizations for anti-gay
discrimination, the Court stated, "[t]he breadth of the amendment is so far
removed from these particular justifications that we find it impossible to
credit them."25 Thus, the measure "lack[ed] a rational relationship to
legitimate state interests.",4 6
Similarly, in Moreno, having found evidence that a particular
provision of federal food stamp law was intended to express hostility
toward persons in unconventional living arrangements-"a bare
congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group" 4- the Court
gave only brief and skeptical consideration to the government's
hypothesized purposes about preventing fraud before dismissing them.248
In Windsor, which struck down the federal Defense of Marriage
Act, the Court ignored hypothesized purposes altogether because the
official purposes Congress had set forth for DOMA were rife with
unconcealed animus. For example, the official House of Representatives
report on DOMA said the legislation was intended to express "both
moral disapproval of homosexuality, and a moral conviction that
heterosexuality better comports with traditional (especially Judeo-
Christian) morality." 4 9 The report put the word "marriage" in demeaning
scarce quotes when referring to same-sex couples.'"" It referred to the
political and legal movement in support of marriage equality as an
"assault against traditional heterosexual marriage laws," .. and referred
to same-sex marriage as "a truly radical proposal that would fundamentally
alter the institution of marriage."'
In the Windsor litigation, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of
the House of Representatives ("BLAG") stepped in to defend DOMA
when the Obama administration declined to. BLAG effectively
disavowed the actual purposes Congress had set forth.'"5 Instead, BLAG
devoted most of its merits brief in the Supreme Court to setting forth a
244. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
245. Id.
246. Id. at 632.
247. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
248. Id. at 536-37.
249. H.R. REP. NO. T04-664, at 16 (1996) (internal footnote omitted).
250. Id. at 2.
251. Id. at 4.
252. Id. at 12.
253. For a discussion on disavowed or repudiated government purposes in litigation, see Karlan, supra
notc jo, at 883-86.
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detailed list of reasonable and benign sounding purposes it said
supported the law, such as "ensuring that similarly-situated couples will
have the same federal benefits regardless of the state in which they
happen to reside" 54 and "avoid[ing] uncertain and unpredictable (but
presumed negative) effects on the federal fisc."2,5 Because most of these
hypothesized purposes played no evident role in the actual congressional
findings or debate about DOMA, they are properly characterized as post
hoc rationalizations-a distinction previously discussed in Part IV.B.
BLAG argued that even if the record behind DOMA manifested animus,
BLAG's post hoc rationalizations could still save the law.2ss
In striking down DOMA, the Court completely ignored BLAG's
hypothesized purposes.257 instead, the Court focused on the purposes
Congress had actually set out in the record. The Court condemned
DOMA for doing what Congress had intended it to do: to express "moral
disapproval of homosexuality.",28 "The avowed purpose and practical
effect of the law here in question are to impose a disadvantage, a
separate status, and so a stigma," the Court concluded.2'" "The history of
DOMA's enactment and its own text demonstrate that interference with
the equal dignity of same-sex marriages,... was more than an incidental
effect of the federal statute. It was its essence.,,2"' DOMA was principally
intended "to impose inequality," deliberately "demean[ing]" same-sex
couples, "burden[ing]" their lives, and "humiliat[ing]" their children.
It is important to remember that Windsor is apparently a rational
basis case. The Court did not apply formal heightened scrutiny, because
it did not find gays and lesbians to be a suspect or quasi-suspect class.
The Court said "no legitimate purpose"-the terminology of rational
basis review-"overcomes [DOMA's] purpose and effect to disparage
and to injure" married same-sex couples.i Windsor thus demonstrates the
tainting effect of animus. "In animus cases, the Court .... does not just
take one proffered justification off the table and then ask the government,
'What else have you got?"'26 Even under rational basis review, "[t]he
254. Brief on the Merits for Respondent the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Grp. of the U.S. House of
Representatives at 33, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (NO. 12-307).
255. Id. at 38.
256. Reply Brief on the Merits for Respondent the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Grp. of the U.S. House of
Representatives at 16, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307) ("Animus is... a conclusion drawn from the
unsuccessful search for rational bases, not a separate inquiry. Since the House has identified numerous
rational bases for DOMA, the inquiry ends there.").
257. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693-95.
258. H.R. RFP. NO. T04-664, at T6 (1996).
259. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693.
260. Id.
26T. Id. at 2694.
262. Id. at 2696 (emphasis added).
263. Carpenter, supra note 59, at 248 (emphasis omitted).
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discovery of animus is instead an affirmative reason to invalidate an
otherwise constitutional law."264
By declining to entertain hypothesized purposes and focusing on
obvious improper purposes, Windsor made an important contribution to
equal protection doctrine. Windsor was the rare rational basis case where
the Court flunked a law based purely on improper purpose, without even
bothering to consider or comment on the fit between the classification
and the purposes offered by the government, as it did in Moreno and
Romer. Improper purpose was found in DOMA's "history of ...
enactment and its own text, ,65 its "operation in practice,", 66 and its
"effect."267 Windsor demonstrates that hypothesized purposes should fail
when a court knows, or can reasonably infer from the totality of the
evidence, that the actual reason for a law can only be explained by
animus. Such a law cannot be rescued by neutral and benign purposes
that have been hypothesized after the fact.
B. EVALUATING ANIMUS AT TRIAL
Under rational basis review, the Supreme Court has said that "a
legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding.""' That
principle makes sense in the context of ordinary legislative decisions and
line drawing. But in light of the foregoing discussion, it should not apply
in situations where a plaintiff has made substantial allegations of animus.
Sometimes a trial will be necessary to determine the role of alleged
animus. And sometimes animus will be confirmed by the failure of
hypothesized purposes, properly tested in a fact finding proceeding, to
account for a classification.2' At the summary judgment stage, the
government should not prevail based on a hypothesized purpose where a
material question of fact exists about animus.
Most of the lower court marriage equality cases preceding Obergefell
were resolved on questions of law without a trial. But two district courts
did hold trials to help determine whether the state bans being challenged
were unconstitutional.
In the Northern District of California, Judge Vaughn Walker said a
trial was necessary to determine, among other things, whether Proposition
8, the California constitutional amendment prohibiting same-sex marriage,
264. Id.
265. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693.
266. Id. at 2694.
267. Id.
268. F.C.C. v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993).
269. See supra notes 243-248 and accompanying discussion in text (describing the Supreme Court's
ends/means analysis in Romer and Moreno); Carpenter, supra note 59, at 246 (explaining that pretext
can be demonstrated by "the utter failure of alternative explanations to offer legitimate ends along
with means that really advance those ends").
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"was passed with discriminatory intent."27 " Based on the trial, Judge Walker
made detailed and carefully documented findings of fact that included
that: "Proposition 8 perpetuates the stereotype that gays and lesbians are
incapable of forming long-term loving relationships and that gays and
lesbians are not good parents[ ]",;27T "[t]he Proposition 8 campaign relied
on fears that children exposed to the concept of same-sex marriage may
become gay or lesbian[]" and that "parents should dread having a gay or
lesbian child"; 27 2 and that "[t]he campaign to pass Proposition 8 relied on
stereotypes to show that same-sex relationships are inferior to opposite-sex
relationships."27' After the state declined to defend Proposition 8 and the
Supreme Court determined that the amendment's proponents lacked
standing to do so, 2 74 Judge Walker's ruling restored legal same-sex
marriage to California.
In the Eastern District of Michigan, Judge Bernard Friedman also
held a trial in the litigation over Michigan's state constitutional gay
marriage ban. The plaintiffs alleged animus, 2 75 and the district court
ultimately held after trial that the ban did not satisfy rational basis
review.276 In overturning Judge Friedman's decision, the Sixth Circuit
noted the trial but did not say that the district court had erred in holding
one.2 77 The Michigan case was one of the four cases before the Supreme
Court in Obergefell, which overturned the Sixth Circuit. None of the
opinions in Obergefell, including the dissents, expressed disapproval that
a trial had been held to adjudicate an equal protection question where
only rational basis review applied.
These trials were appropriate. In order to engage in "searching"
review of a classification that comes to the court bearing suspicion of
278improper purpose, a court may need to go beyond the summary
judgment papers and evaluate disputed questions of material fact about
the law's history, context, and effects. In such circumstances, hypothesized
purposes should be evaluated through ordinary fact finding. Even before
Windsor," the Supreme Court had never instructed lower courts to
ignore colorable allegations that improper purpose was lurking behind a
law that superficially appeared-or could be made to appear-to pursue
neutral, legitimate purposes. To say that a legislature is not required to
270. Bob Egelko, Judge Refuses to Toss Suit Challenging Prop. 8, SFGATF (Oct. 15, 2009, 4:oo AM)
http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Judge-refuses-to-toss-suit-challenging-Prop-8-3213322.php.
271. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921. 979 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
272. Id. at 988.
273. Id. at 990.
274. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013).
275. DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757, 773 (E.D. Mich. 2014).
276. Id. at 770-75.
277. See DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 397 (6th Cir. 2014).
278. See supra noteS 224-229 and accompanying discussion in text.
279. See supra notes 249-261 and accompanying discussion in text.
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"articulate its reasons for enacting a statute,,..o is not the same thing as
saying that, in the proper case, judges are forbidden from trying to figure
them out.
The admonition that "a legislative choice is not subject to courtroom
factfinding""' is best understood as a warning that courts should not purport
to factually test the wisdom of legislative policy choices-for example, how
the government should regulate a particular industry."" But where there is
"some reason to infer antipathy,"' this deferential form of rational basis
does not apply.28 4
VI. HYPOTHESIZED PURPOSES AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY
The Supreme Court has always discussed the rationale for
hypothesized purposes in the context of an ordinary legislative lawmaking
process. Acceptance of hypothesized purposes is bound up with notions
of separation of powers and judicial deference to legislative processes
and legislators' policy judgments.
Most of the state gay marriage bans that were challenged in federal
courts that had been defended with hypothesized purposes-including
those from all four states in Obergefell-were not statutory. They were
state constitutional amendments-enactments of fundamental law, not
statutes-that had been adopted after vigorous public debate through
voter referenda. In Obergefell, the Supreme Court ignored an intriguing
question: Do the rationales for hypothesized purposes properly extend to
laws enacted through direct democracy?
The better answer is "no." However much they have become an
accepted feature of rational basis review, hypothesized purposes still
represent a compromise of the principle that courts exist to enforce
constitutional rights and limitations on government. That compromise-the
"presumption of constitutionality"-is justified out of trust that a co-
equal branch, the legislature, will take care not to violate constitutional
rights." But there is no basis for a similar level of trust when laws are
made through direct democracy. Thus, hypothesized purposes should be
carefully and skeptically examined by courts in judicial review of
referenda and ballot initiatives because direct democracy lacks the
setting and characteristics of an ordinary lawmaking process which is
what justifies court's acceptance of hypothesized purposes in the first
place. Courts should be especially dubious of hypothesized purposes
when a referendum or ballot initiative concerns a matter on which there
280. F.C.C. v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 5o8 U.S. 307, 315 (T993).
281. Id.
282. See id. at 317-20 (discussing congressional regulation of the tclocommunications industry).
283. Id. at 314.
284. See supra notes 65-73 (contrasting the two approaches).
285. See supra notCs 26-34 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 68:657704
April 2017] THE USE AND ABUSE OFIYPOTHESIZED PURPOSES
has been vigorous, open, high-profile public debate, because the debate
should help make clear the actual purpose the referendum or ballot
initiative is intended to accomplish.
A. DEFERENCE TO LEGISLATURES, NOT PLEBISCITES
The Supreme Court has never expressly limited hypothesized purposes
to statutes enacted through an ordinary legislative process. Yet that is the
context in which all of the Court's statements of rationale for
hypothesized purposes have arisen. The Court has never spoken of
measures enacted through direct democracy in the same way.
The rationale for a high level of judicial deference to legislative
decisionmaking-and, accordingly, the rationale for the acceptability of
hypothesized purposes-has always been grounded in the nature of the
legislative function. The job of legislators is to take cognizance of social
needs and problems, gather facts, consider the preferences of constituents,
and then make choices among (sometimes competing) policy options. In a
democracy, these functions are outside the role and competencies of
courts. "[I]t is for the legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages
and disadvantages of" particular policy choices, the Court explained in
Williamson,"' the foundational case for hypothesized purposes. "It is
enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be
thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to
correct it."
Furthermore, the legislative process is inherently incremental.
Courts refrain from reviewing the merits of legislative decisions "because
legislators and administrators are properly concerned with balancing
numerous competing considerations.""' Judicial review ordinarily should
be limited and deferential "where the legislature must necessarily engage
in a process of line-drawing[,]"'" because "the legislature must be
allowed leeway to approach a perceived problem incrementally.""'
286. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955).
287. Id. at 488.
288. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dcv. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977).
289. F.C.C. v. Beach Commc'ns, 508 U.S. 307. 315 (1993) (quoting U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S.
T66,179 (1980)).
290. Id. at 3T6; see Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970) ("[T]he Equal Protection Clause
does not require that a State must choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the
problem at all.").
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The problem of legislative classification is a perennial one, admitting of no
doctrinaire definition. Evils in the same field may be of different
dimensions and proportions, requiring different remedies. Or so the
legislature may think. Or the reform may take one step at a time,
addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to
the legislative mind. The legislature may select one phase of one field and
apply a remedy there, neglecting the others."9
The Court has repeated this same basic guidance a number of times,
and it has invariably been in the context of ordinary statutory lawmaking by
elected representatives. "[E]qual protection," the Court has said, "is not a
license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative
choices" concerning a "statutory classification.,2 2 "A statutory discrimination
will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to
justify it."'9 A "legislative choice" does not undergo "courtroom fact-finding
and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or
empirical data."2 94 This deference is necessary "to preserve to the legislative
branch its rightful independence and its ability to function.""5
It is these legislative process considerations that justify hypothesized
purposes. Because "a classification in a statute" comes to the Court
"bearing a strong presumption of validity," a legislature is not required "to
articulate its reasons for enacting" the classification, and "it is entirely
irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the
challenged distinction"-that is, the hypothesized purpose-"actually
motivated the legislature.2,6
It is important, too, that legislators are accountable to the public for
their votes when they stand for reelection. The Court has often repeated,
"[t]he Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy,
even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic
process and that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter
how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted.""
The Court has never provided "a coherent or even internally
consistent analysis of how courts ought to go about reviewing direct
democracy measures affecting minority interests and rights,""" but it has
also never said that classifications enacted through direct democracy
deserved a high level of deference for the same reasons as matters
enacted through the normal legislative process. In civil rights decisions
over the years, the Court has made clear that "insisting . .. that the
291. Williamson, 348 U.S. at 489 (internal citations omitted).
292. Beach Commc'ns, 508 U.S. at 313 (emphasis added).
293. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961) (emphasis added).
294. Beach Commc'ns, 5o8 U.S. at 315 (emphasis added).
295. Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
296. Id. at 314, 315.
297. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93,97 (1979).
298. Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Judicial Review of Initiatives and Referendums in Which Majorities Vote
on Minorities' Democratic Citizenship, 6o OHITO ST. L.J. 399, 405 (1999).
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people may retain for themselves the power over certain subjects may
generally be true, but these principles furnish no justification for a
legislative structure which otherwise would violate the Fourteenth
Amendment." ," Implementation of a classification through a "popular
referendum" does not "immunize it" from scrutiny."' "The sovereignty
of the people is itself subject to those constitutional limitations which
have been duly adopted and remain unrepealed."' Indeed, a substantial
literature on direct democracy documents that it is frequently harmful to
minority rights.'" As Julian Eule has argued in a major article on the
subject, "judicial review of direct democracy frequently calls for less
rather than more restraint" by the judiciary.'"" Hypothesized purposes
seem especially problematic where a referendum or ballot initiative
involves an enactment of fundamental law like a state constitutional
amendment, even in states where an amendment requires both legislative
action and a voter referendum. A constitutional amendment is, by
definition, an extraordinary exercise of a state's lawmaking power, not an
exercise in routine legislative line-drawing or part of an ongoing
legislative process where competing interests may be considered and
balanced. Constitutional provisions express fundamental law. Because
constitutions trump ordinary statutes, a constitutional provision disables
a legislature from revisiting the same question at a later time in light of
new facts, data, or circumstances. Constitutional amendments do not
represent incrementalism, balancing of competing interests, or moving
"one step at a time." Other questions of judicial review for constitutional
amendments are beyond the scope of this Article, but it seems a minimal
expectation that courts should seek to understand the actual government
purpose that is served by a fundamental law.
One might argue that if hypothesized purposes are to be rigorously
examined in judicial review of direct democracy, it should only be on
matters affecting the rights of minority groups, because that is where the
danger of hidden animus is highest. Certainly that is the setting where
the argument for skeptical review of hypothesized purposes is strongest.
But a premise of this Article is that the acceptance of hypothesized
purposes represents a compromise of constitutional values, a compromise
that should be justified. Principles of separation of powers and deference
to the legislative process provide this justification in cases of ordinary
299. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392 (1969).
300. Washington v. Scattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 476 (1982).
301. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 392.
302. See, e.g., Barbara S. Gamble, Putting Civil Rights to a Popular Vote, 41 AM. J. PoT.. SCT. 245 (1997);
Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not "Republican Government": The Campaign Against
Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REV. 19 (1993); Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YATE L.J.
1503 (1990); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Lecture Series, The Referendum: Democracy's Barrier to Racial Equality,
54 WAsII. L. REv. I (1978).
303. Eule, supra note 302, at T507.
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legislation. But such justification is lacking in the context of direct
democracy. It is not the role of courts to superintend direct democracy,
but it is the role of judicial review to identify and remedy injuries to
legally protected interests. Ballot measures dealing with public resources,
business regulation, taxation, and other matters can work concrete
economic or social harms beyond just the interests of minority groups.""
Undoubtedly the vast majority of such measures reflect legitimate policy
choices that voters should be allowed to make, and their purposes will be
clear either on their face or from their immediate effects. But if a
measure is challenged as causing constitutional harm, a court should deal
as much as possible with ascertainable facts. If a challenge to a matter
enacted through direct democracy fails, it should be on the merits, not
because the government had the advantage of being able to substitute
unexamined hypothesized purposes for real ones.
B. GIVING DUE REGARD TO THE PUBLIC DEBATE
Hypothesized purposes should also be disfavored and closely
examined in the context of measures adopted through direct democracy
because there is no good reason why courts should ignore the substance
and consequences of a public debate. Even though legislators are ultimately
accountable to the voters for their policy judgments, sometimes legislative
decisionmaking is a black box. Deals are brokered behind the scenes.
Votes might be cast with little floor debate. States might not maintain
transcripts of floor speeches or other formal legislative history. These
messy realities of the legislative process help explain why plausible
hypothesized purposes may be acceptable in the context of ordinary
lawmaking.
Referenda and ballot initiatives concerning obscure or
noncontroversial matters might present some of the same difficulties for
judicial review. But it seems odd to suggest that measures adopted after a
robust and wide-open public debate-such as the state constitutional
amendments banning gay marriage-suffer from the same inscrutability.
For example, according to Judge Sutton's opinion for the Sixth Circuit,
voters engaged in a "deliberative process" and "profound policy debate"
that allowed them "to discuss and weigh arguments for and against same-
304. E.g. St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215. 223-27 (5th Cir. 2013) (rejecting the government's
argument that a measure intended to benefit funeral directors by giving them a monopoly on the sale of
caskets could be upheld as a consumer protection or health and safety regulation, because those arguments
were unsupported by evidence); Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002) (reaching he same
conclusion as St. Joseph Abbey). These were cases about legislation, not ballot initiatives, but they illustrate
how some courts have been willing to seriously examine hypothesized purposes for plausibility even outside
the context of animus.
305. F.C.C. v. Beach Commc'ns. Inc., 508 U.S. 307 315 (1993) ("[We never require a legislature to
articulate its reasons for enacting a statute . . . .").
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sex marriage.""' Justice Scalia called the public debate over same-sex
marriage an example of "American democracy at its best."'17 If these
statements are to be taken seriously as more than just puffery, then there
was no warrant for courts to entertain hypothesized purposes for the
marriage bans. Doing so disregarded, and thus disrespected, the
democratic process that voters engaged in. Michigan's brief told the
Court, "[i]t is 'demeaning to the democratic process to presume that the
voters are not capable of deciding an issue of this sensitivity on decent
and rational grounds.'""" But it is also demeaning to the democratic
process for a state's lawyers to insist, in effect, that courts must avert
their gaze or pretend that the process was without any actual substance.
And it is demeaning to the democratic process for a state's executive
officials to paper over that process and substitute their own post hoc
rationalizations instead.""
It is sometimes assumed that evaluating a direct democracy enactment
for animus or other improper purposes requires the impossible task of
getting inside the heads of voters. For example, the Sixth Circuit refused
to seriously consider the plaintiffs' arguments about animus by observing,
in essence, that some people voted for the mini-DOMAs, some voted
against them, and that is all we can ever know: "If assessing the motives
of multimember legislatures is difficult, assessing the motives of" millions
of voters in four state referenda "strains judicial competence."' In the
end, Judge Sutton threw up his hands and, in effect, asked, Who am I to
judge?
It is true, of course, that the motives of an individual citizen for
casting a vote cannot be known or assessed by judges. But as discussed at
the outset of this Article, motive should not be confused with purpose."'
As demonstrated in Part III, it is possible to assess the history, context,
and effects of the mini-DOMAs as an objective matter without inquiring
about the subjective motives of individual voters. The evidence pointed
toward holding the mini-DOMAs unconstitutional because they were the
products of a process infected by animus. Others might consider the
same evidence and reach a different conclusion. The point is that the
history, context, and effects of the mini-DOMA campaigns were susceptible
to judicial evaluation. Hypothesized purposes were not necessary.
306. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 408 (6th Cir. 2014).
307. Obergelell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2627 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
308. Brief for Mich. Defendants-Appellants, supra note 77, at 2 (quoting Schuette v. Coal. to Defend,
134 S. Ct. 1623, 1637 (2014) (plurality opinion)).
309. See supra Part IV.B.
31o. DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 409.
311. See supra notcs 40-53 and accompanying discussion in text.
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CONCLUSION
Hypothesized purposes have been an accepted feature of equal
protection's rational basis review for more than half a century. They
represent a compromise, trading away some of the judiciary's authority to
enforce constitutional limitations based on the principle that the legislative
branch generally should be trusted not to violate constitutional rights.
The recent federal marriage litigation provides examples of how
hypothesized purposes can be abused. From that experience it is possible
to extract some lessons. Classifications must be properly defined.
Hypothesis should not mean the creation of new facts and purposes out
of whole cloth, divorced from any plausible legislative considerations,
through post hoc rationalization. Hypothesized purposes cannot be used
as fig leaves to cover up animus. And the justifications for hypothesized
purposes, grounded in judicial deference to the ordinary processes of
legislative lawmaking, do not support their use in judicial review of direct
democracy.
In Obergefell, the Supreme Court missed an opportunity to clarify
doctrine on the question of hypothesized purposes. But perhaps lower
courts will apply some of these lessons in future cases nonetheless. After
all, this Article does not argue for changes to the Court's doctrine.
Rather, it argues that courts should do their duty under judicial review
when government defendants venture beyond what current doctrine
reasonably allows.
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